I could response with so much, simply because your writing has so much in it. I've read through parts, and skimmed through others. I will quote the meat of an analysis from Geopolitical Futures, one of my strategic forecasting services:
Nothing Has Changed With Taiwan
By: George Friedman
On Aug. 17, 1982, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz sent a memo via an American diplomat to the Taiwanese government. On Monday, just over 38 years later, the memo was declassified. Its contents were “secret” in that they were not publicly available, but the gist has been well known for some time; these points had to be part of U.S. relations with Taiwan and China because without them, U.S. policy toward Taiwan and China made no sense.
The decision to make public a document after nearly 40 years comes at a time of rising tensions, military drills and Chinese threats in the Taiwan Strait, and is meant to stave off more escalation by clarifying its position. The memo outlines the following:
That the U.S. had not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan
That the U.S. had not agreed to consult with China on arms sales to Taiwan
That the U.S. would not play a mediation role between Taipei and Beijing
That the U.S. had not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations Act
That the U.S. had not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan
That the U.S. would not exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the People's Republic of China
In other words, the United States was not prepared in any substantial way to abandon Taiwan, and by releasing the memo, Washington confirmed that the position it has held since 1982 has remained in place, and that China should understand as much.
The original context for the memo had to do with Richard Nixon’s visit to China, a groundbreaking trip born of mutual concern. Russian-Chinese relations were bad after the bloody conflict on the Ussuri River. China was afraid that the Soviets could defeat it. Meanwhile, the U.S., emerging bloodied from Vietnam, had weakened its position in Western Europe and feared the Soviets might take advantage of this opening. By restoring ties with the Chinese, the United States balanced this threat and opened a new threat against the Soviets if both attacked simultaneously.
It made no ideological sense but perfect geopolitical sense. Yet, it left open the status of Taiwan. The Chinese insisted that Taiwan was part of China, and Nixon agreed with them in principle so long as it was understood that it meant nothing in practice. The Soviet Union was the central issue.
By the 1980s, the Soviets were weakening a bit, the Chinese were increasing their power, and the Taiwan issue became more important. Ronald Reagan, of course, wouldn’t budge, so the memo – which was and remains the U.S. policy on China – slammed shut the door on modifying its Taiwan policy. It may not have explicitly said that the U.S. would intervene if China invaded Taiwan, but it left little to the imagination.
"U.S.-Chinese relations have since deteriorated, and China has raised the possibility of invasion in various ways. Releasing this memo at this time does not surprise China, but does affirm that any Chinese move must take into account a U.S. intervention. Unlike many China watchers, the Chinese themselves know that an amphibious assault on Taiwan – armed as it is with U.S. aircraft, submarines and missile defense batteries – would likely fail, and that failure would vastly weaken their pretense of being a power on par with the United States."
The memo referred to in the paragraph is:
"On Aug. 17, 1982, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz sent a memo via an American diplomat to the Taiwanese government. On Monday, just over 38 years later, the memo was declassified. Its contents were “secret” in that they were not publicly available, but the gist has been well known for some time; these points had to be part of U.S. relations with Taiwan and China because without them, U.S. policy toward Taiwan and China made no sense.
The decision to make public a document after nearly 40 years comes at a time of rising tensions, military drills and Chinese threats in the Taiwan Strait, and is meant to stave off more escalation by clarifying its position. The memo outlines the following:
That the U.S. had not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan
That the U.S. had not agreed to consult with China on arms sales to Taiwan
That the U.S. would not play a mediation role between Taipei and Beijing
That the U.S. had not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations Act
That the U.S. had not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan
That the U.S. would not exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the People's Republic of China"
I don't know why Trump doesn't hawk his foreign policy, which has been better than the previous administration's. According to interviews with ambassadors, he checks in on something, asks how's it going, then says something like, "Better sooner than later." He seems to know what they're working on, but lets them do it. With the quiet release of this memo, he's restated the US position on Taiwan. Don't forget that early in his administration he visited Taiwan.
The #1 deterrent to China acting militarily has to be the fact that Trump is psychologically decompensating and we are closer than ever to a significant, irrational act — like deployment of nuclear arms — on his part. He would think nothing of the costs, which include but aren’t limited to human Chinese lives, American lives in the response, economic catastrophe from severed trade. And would think only about the (perceived) projection of strength and (perceived) benefits accruing to his re-election. The Chinese have to know that he is unstable, terrified of losing power, and absolutely capable of ordering a nuclear strike.
I'm sure that Xi has thought about this, but how wedded is he to it? He doesn't give a fig for world opinion. But this action is above and beyond the purely internal actions he has taken so far. Would he tie his prestige to such a risk? Defeat is certainly possible, and the definition of defeat is correspondingly wide. Not the best course for an autocrat who is already firmly entrenched,
Will we in future associate Xi with Galtieri, both an island too far.
Oh, I dunno; maybe because there's this big ocean thing between them, while amphibious operations are the most difficult military operations of all, and China has no real experience at it? That could be a reason. Or maybe because the CCP is inherently rather conservative and highly risk averse, while being stomped like Narcs at a biker rally in an invasion of Taiwan might just cause them to be toppled? Or maybe because, while neither the US nor the PRC understands the other, nor ever has, this tends to play to conservatism and risk aversion where either might get involved?
I could response with so much, simply because your writing has so much in it. I've read through parts, and skimmed through others. I will quote the meat of an analysis from Geopolitical Futures, one of my strategic forecasting services:
Nothing Has Changed With Taiwan
By: George Friedman
On Aug. 17, 1982, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz sent a memo via an American diplomat to the Taiwanese government. On Monday, just over 38 years later, the memo was declassified. Its contents were “secret” in that they were not publicly available, but the gist has been well known for some time; these points had to be part of U.S. relations with Taiwan and China because without them, U.S. policy toward Taiwan and China made no sense.
The decision to make public a document after nearly 40 years comes at a time of rising tensions, military drills and Chinese threats in the Taiwan Strait, and is meant to stave off more escalation by clarifying its position. The memo outlines the following:
That the U.S. had not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan
That the U.S. had not agreed to consult with China on arms sales to Taiwan
That the U.S. would not play a mediation role between Taipei and Beijing
That the U.S. had not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations Act
That the U.S. had not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan
That the U.S. would not exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the People's Republic of China
In other words, the United States was not prepared in any substantial way to abandon Taiwan, and by releasing the memo, Washington confirmed that the position it has held since 1982 has remained in place, and that China should understand as much.
The original context for the memo had to do with Richard Nixon’s visit to China, a groundbreaking trip born of mutual concern. Russian-Chinese relations were bad after the bloody conflict on the Ussuri River. China was afraid that the Soviets could defeat it. Meanwhile, the U.S., emerging bloodied from Vietnam, had weakened its position in Western Europe and feared the Soviets might take advantage of this opening. By restoring ties with the Chinese, the United States balanced this threat and opened a new threat against the Soviets if both attacked simultaneously.
It made no ideological sense but perfect geopolitical sense. Yet, it left open the status of Taiwan. The Chinese insisted that Taiwan was part of China, and Nixon agreed with them in principle so long as it was understood that it meant nothing in practice. The Soviet Union was the central issue.
By the 1980s, the Soviets were weakening a bit, the Chinese were increasing their power, and the Taiwan issue became more important. Ronald Reagan, of course, wouldn’t budge, so the memo – which was and remains the U.S. policy on China – slammed shut the door on modifying its Taiwan policy. It may not have explicitly said that the U.S. would intervene if China invaded Taiwan, but it left little to the imagination.
"U.S.-Chinese relations have since deteriorated, and China has raised the possibility of invasion in various ways. Releasing this memo at this time does not surprise China, but does affirm that any Chinese move must take into account a U.S. intervention. Unlike many China watchers, the Chinese themselves know that an amphibious assault on Taiwan – armed as it is with U.S. aircraft, submarines and missile defense batteries – would likely fail, and that failure would vastly weaken their pretense of being a power on par with the United States."
The memo referred to in the paragraph is:
"On Aug. 17, 1982, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz sent a memo via an American diplomat to the Taiwanese government. On Monday, just over 38 years later, the memo was declassified. Its contents were “secret” in that they were not publicly available, but the gist has been well known for some time; these points had to be part of U.S. relations with Taiwan and China because without them, U.S. policy toward Taiwan and China made no sense.
The decision to make public a document after nearly 40 years comes at a time of rising tensions, military drills and Chinese threats in the Taiwan Strait, and is meant to stave off more escalation by clarifying its position. The memo outlines the following:
That the U.S. had not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan
That the U.S. had not agreed to consult with China on arms sales to Taiwan
That the U.S. would not play a mediation role between Taipei and Beijing
That the U.S. had not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations Act
That the U.S. had not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan
That the U.S. would not exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the People's Republic of China"
I don't know why Trump doesn't hawk his foreign policy, which has been better than the previous administration's. According to interviews with ambassadors, he checks in on something, asks how's it going, then says something like, "Better sooner than later." He seems to know what they're working on, but lets them do it. With the quiet release of this memo, he's restated the US position on Taiwan. Don't forget that early in his administration he visited Taiwan.
The #1 deterrent to China acting militarily has to be the fact that Trump is psychologically decompensating and we are closer than ever to a significant, irrational act — like deployment of nuclear arms — on his part. He would think nothing of the costs, which include but aren’t limited to human Chinese lives, American lives in the response, economic catastrophe from severed trade. And would think only about the (perceived) projection of strength and (perceived) benefits accruing to his re-election. The Chinese have to know that he is unstable, terrified of losing power, and absolutely capable of ordering a nuclear strike.
I'm sure that Xi has thought about this, but how wedded is he to it? He doesn't give a fig for world opinion. But this action is above and beyond the purely internal actions he has taken so far. Would he tie his prestige to such a risk? Defeat is certainly possible, and the definition of defeat is correspondingly wide. Not the best course for an autocrat who is already firmly entrenched,
Will we in future associate Xi with Galtieri, both an island too far.
Thanks for the column.
Oh, I dunno; maybe because there's this big ocean thing between them, while amphibious operations are the most difficult military operations of all, and China has no real experience at it? That could be a reason. Or maybe because the CCP is inherently rather conservative and highly risk averse, while being stomped like Narcs at a biker rally in an invasion of Taiwan might just cause them to be toppled? Or maybe because, while neither the US nor the PRC understands the other, nor ever has, this tends to play to conservatism and risk aversion where either might get involved?