23 Comments

A few observations:

(1) Nuclear power does not necessarily = nuclear proliferation. It depends on the specifics of the case, and to claim that assisting Australia in the development of nuclear-propelled submarines amounts to nuclear proliferation is dubious to say the least.

(2) Given a capability to build and operate the latter, the choice between advanced conventionally powered submarines and nuclear-powered submarines is a question of strategy. For countries like Germany and Sweden, whose navies operate in such restricted waters as the Baltic and the North Sea, conventionally powered attack submarines make sense. But given Australia's strategic priorities and geographical situation, nuclear attack submarines constitute the obvious choice. The speed, range, endurance and stealth of SSNs make them far superior to even the most advanced conventional submarine, especially in the Pacific. And if SSNs are going to be procured, doing so in partnership with the US and the UK is the best option. Since 1954, the US Navy has amassed unrivalled experience in the design and operation of nuclear-powered submarines. The UK is not far behind, having commissioned its first SSN in 1963.

(3) It may seem remarkable that eight SSNs for the RAN are envisioned, but in order to keep three or four boats operational at all times, six to eight would be required.

(4) France's angry reaction to the loss of the Australian contract undoubtedly has something to do with the botched Afghanistan withdrawal. The Biden Administration's incompetence in that instance left the French government fit to be tied; now comes the loss of a $60 billion contract. Of course it was the Australian government that pulled the plug, probably deciding that the French proposal for a conventionally powered version of its SSN design was not a good idea.

(5) A strong force of SSNs armed with standoff weapons like the Tomahawk cruise missile is probably the most cost-effective deterrent to Chinese aggression. For instance, in the event of an attempt to invade Taiwan, submarine-launched cruise missile strikes on the ports of embarkation of the invasion force would be an effective early response, buying time for the deployment of reinforcements to the region.

Expand full comment

I am going to respond back to Eric Hines a bit later when I get some more time but something I want to point out big picture to CG's like Owen Lewis and Robert Zubrin is if you want to make greater use of advanced technologies like using re-useable rockets for point to point transportation on earth and to use advanced nuclear technologies for space exploration then not only you are going to have to maintain existing non proliferation norms you are going to have to strengthen them even further i.e. if Elon Musk wants to fly point to point Starship rocket flights between NYC and Shanghai you are going to to have to find some way to assure to Chinese that a SpaceX Starship is what it is and not an incoming nuclear armed ICBM. While people like Elon Musk have indicated their desire for such technologies we have yet to have a conversation on the rules and legalities of doing so.

Expand full comment

“ Crucially, there seems to have been little to no warning given to the French.” (Robin Häggblom)

Maybe it’s just me, but is anyone else surprised that General Milley didn’t give his French colleagues a heads-up?

Expand full comment
Sep 18, 2021Liked by Claire Berlinski

Couple things, in no particular order, so this will come off (sorry) as rambling.

One is that the French attitude toward the US is...meh. The French, over this, also canceled a dinner commemorating the 240th anniversary of the Battle of the Capes, a French-English fight of some minor use to us in our Revolutionary War.

Keep in mind that France never has been a real friend. Their real involvement in our Revolutionary War came late and only because our win, which seemed likely only late, would harm Great Britain to French advantage. Benefit to us was a tool not an end.

Keep in mind, too, their arrogance toward both us, and toward Great Britain (another signatory to the AUKUS), in their insistence that they should lead the march through Paris late in WWII, instead of either of the two armies that had actually liberated France leading that celebratory stroll.

Too, they bolted from the military arm of NATO and demanded our total departure from France, relenting only slightly and only when LBJ asked if we should withdraw all of our dead in French cemeteries, too.

France still holds a grudge against us over that last because we wouldn't help them maintain their SEA-based colonial empire. (We stepped on the Brits, too, over the Suez Canal a short time later, but we both got over that.)

And they've always been full of anti-American rhetoric of greater or lesser seriousness.

It's certainly true, and stupidly arrogantly so, that the Biden-Harris administration should have coordinated better with France over the sub deal (into which we entered late and after France and Australia were approaching the signing step) and over the AUKUS deal. But that did real damage only slightly, given France, its French Polynesia holdings, has nothing to contribute to the Pacific region, and has had nothing since the Vietnamese ran them out of SEA.

It's also instructive that France's ire is directed against us, publicly at least and not against Australia, who is the one that walked away late in the deal. Was Australia's decision really a surprise? Maybe. Maybe not. We don't know what behind the scenes discussions were going on between Australia and France over the sub deal before frustration boiled over and Australia took a decision.

The idea that Australia will build the subs instead of buying off the shelf (hopefully, had that been their decision, anyway, "off-the-shelf" would have been heavily updated) will be hugely expensive is to be expected--as an upfront cost. The Aussies will be gutsing up a new industry. But it's a capability that they need to bring in-house, anyway, and it will pay dividends in the mid- to long-run.

The idea that they're buying/building 8 SSNs and that that will be more than either France or UK have also is not surprising. As noted at the outset of this article, Australia is surrounded by vasty amounts of water. I'll add that it is, for the most part, hostile water, with the PRC occupying international water and islands (and disputed among the South China Sea rim nations) islands and so sitting on Australia's front yard gate. UK and France, on the other hand, operate in much smaller and much safer waters, at least relatively.

France says they were excluded from AUKUS? Based on what facts, other than their smiling faces? There is a world of difference among being excluded, being not invited in, and being not interested when the idea came up quietly. The most likely difference here, though, is the difference between being excluded and not being invited. But what value, really, would France add to the arrangement? French Polynesian naval base(s)? How many non-French NATO troops are stationed in France, even after they rejoined the military arm of NATO? The US, for what we're worth under the Biden-Harris administration, has a large military presence throughout the Pacific, the UK has a large diplomatic and influence presence and a capability to put serious naval units there, and Australia is a willing base of operations that is actively looking to strengthen its own military presence.

There's more, but this is enough rambling.

Eric Hines

Expand full comment