Russian foreign policy expert: We're winning
Russian propagandists: Actually, this is a cluster-f*ck.
Stop whatever you’re doing and watch this remarkable interview Zelensky gave to independent Russian journalists, who defied Russian government orders not to release it. Read the comments, in Russian, below the video:
Russia
In Russian, an illuminating interview with Andrey Sushentsov, the director of the Valdai Club and the Dean of the Faculty of International Relations of MGIMO—a think tank under the aegis of Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.1 So interesting that I’ve posted almost the whole of it. If you see any errors in Google’s translation or my corrections to improve the grammar, let me know:
Question: A month ago, an event occurred that radically changed the course of modern world history. On February 24, 2022, Vladimir Putin ordered the start of Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine. Four weeks later, this operation continues. Therefore, it is clearly too early to sum up even preliminary results. But the mind also refuses not to sum up these preliminary results. Today, all of us need awareness the way we need air: where are we going, why are we going there, and when exactly we will get there. …
Sushentsov: … Russia’s use of force will create a new negotiating reality. The words of our diplomats will now be listened to more carefully. The previous formula of Western politicians, “Russia is on the wrong side of history. She has her own version of events, but we will ignore it,” has exhausted its resourcefulness. It became clear that ours is not just a “version of events,” but a demanding negotiating position aimed at creating a security system in Europe taking into account Russia’s interests. The sobering of political elites in the West will definitely come. After this large-scale shake-up, all the dust that used to prevent them from understanding the real outlines of the problems will settle.
Question: And how long will we have to wait for this “dust subsiding?” After all, there are no special signs now of a “new negotiating reality” in Europe.
Sushentsov: In the acute phase of the crisis, there’s a lot of panic in the press and examples of how professional political mourners tear their hair. But here’s what’s primary. Any constructive relationship—be it hostile or friendly— should not be ideological and naively enthusiastic. It should be based on cold pragmatism …
Question: Do we have the slightest chance of avoiding becoming a “younger brother” to China?
Sushentsov: In each of my conversations with Western colleagues, this thesis necessarily appears: Russia is in decline and will be subordinate to China. Since there is nothing worse than that, your real friends are us, the West.
I answer this with a Russian proverb: you don’t need enemies with such “friends!” The dawn of bilateral Russian-Chinese relations that we are witnessing is natural and has fundamental reasons. We are very important partners for each other in terms of rivalry with the United States in different geographical theaters.
A well-known metaphor is that Russia and China look in different directions, standing with their backs to each other. The focus of Russian attention is aimed at Europe, the focus of Chinese attention is on the Pacific Ocean. At both of these points, our interests contradict American interests, and this makes us natural allies.
Question: At the moment, Beijing, if it supports Moscow, does so very carefully, maintaining the appearance of neutrality. How long, from your point of view, will China be able to “sit on the fence?”
Sushentsov: China is not an active player in the field of European security. And it would be strange if it suddenly became such a player. Something like this can’t be ruled out in the distant future. …
Question: But is Beijing ready to get out this “active reserve?” America threatens China with “serious consequences” if it begins to more actively help Moscow cope with the consequences of Western sanctions. Won’t it happen that the PRC will listen to these warnings and leave us alone with our economic problems?
Sushentsov: That’s what the US expects. But the Ukrainian crisis has a big global dimension. It is only part of the big picture of the erosion of global American domination that has been observed over the past 20 years. China is as interested in the further erosion of this dominance as Russia.
Now the key thesis of American foreign policy is being tested—that China is an absolutely economically-thinking entity that will never take steps that will harm its economic growth and development. At the same time, the Americans themselves are constantly escalating tension in East Asia. They support the system of anti-Chinese alliances in this region, pump up their allies with weapons, pursue a policy of strategic uncertainty towards Taiwan.
Of course, such a frontal attack on Chinese interests is interpreted in Beijing only as aggressive steps. Therefore, the current periodic conciliation of American leaders against China sound quite strange—just like my traditional dialogue with American colleagues: “You understand that we are your best friends!”
Question: Despite the strangeness of their theses, America, unlike us, has retained freedom of maneuver in world politics, don’t you think so?
Sushentsov: On the contrary, I think that colleagues from the United States realize that their risks in this big game are comparable to Russian ones, and maybe even more. The fate of the dollar as a global reserve currency, the fate of the US alliance system and its military guarantees, the authority and capacity of the United States as the world’s main security guarantor are at stake.
… For many countries that seek foreign policy independence, the question will be: where exactly and in what form do we store excess resources? Does it now make sense to do it in the form of US government loan bonds and keep them in Western banks? Or is it wiser to change them for resources that can be sovereignly managed, regardless who thinks what about your foreign policy? … By initiating the freezing of Russian gold and foreign exchange reserves, the Americans launched a chain reaction of doubt about the truly global nature of the world economy, the protection of countries’ financial assets in foreign markets.
Question: Do we have any chance of getting those frozen assets back?
Sushentsov: It’s in the West’s interest to preserve at least partially the global nature of financial markets. … The story knows a lot of quite funny episodes. Approaching now the revival of the Iranian nuclear deal, the Americans and British are beginning to offer Tehran very favorable conditions. For example, the Iranians bargained for compensation from the British for tanks not delivered by the British in the ‘70s of the last century.
Question: I don’t want to wait 50 years, so I will ask: what will be the priority for American leaders—economically strangling Russia at any cost, or preventing the development of a very close link between Russia and China?
Sushentsov: Among American analysts of the realist inclination, this second idea sounds right: We shouldn’t create a desperate situation for Russia, then it will have no alternative but to focus exclusively on China.
But the majority in the United States now, of course, advocates economically strangling our country—especially during the current acute phase of the crisis. They’re under the illusion that a sharp blow, a raft of sanctions restrictions will cause a shock reaction in Russian society and undermine support for the authorities.
In the longer term, the second goal will become more important for the US authorities. If they see that they can’t undermine the logic of Russia’s actions, that in itself will be a defeat for them. The hysteria will begin to subside. They will create gambits aimed at blurring Russian-Chinese ties. Examples of such actions are now before our eyes: They’re trying to manipulatively revive relations with Venezuela and Iran to reduce the severity of the energy crisis in world markets.
Question: Looking to the future, do you see any positive scenarios for Russia’s development, and if so, which ones?
Sushentsov: There was one major flaw in the system of our relations with the West, which existed until February 24. We were participants in interdependent relations with the West, based on economic exchange and Russia’s participation in the Western-centered global economy. And the West’s hypothesis was that our interest in participating in this economy was significantly more significant than our interests in ensuring our security. This drama escalated over the 30 years since the collapse of the USSR and had to be resolved in one way or another.
How did the West think it would be resolved? “Russia will cease to be a strategic player, stop resisting and silently move to the second league of world politics.”
An alternative scenario—that is currently being implemented—was that the accumulated tension would explode in a crisis. This crisis is destroying the old security systems and structures in Europe and our economic interactions with the West. But as a result of this crisis—depending how it is resolved—new structures will emerge. They probably won’t be so intertwined. But they will still allow for optimal economic exchanges in the interests of both parties.
I don’t believe the scenario of a total economic blockade of Russia, which now scares us, will come to pass. It’s impossible. Russia is not an island. Most often I talk about that with regret: When you’re an island, it’s easier for you to ensure your safety. But in an economic sense, the fact that we have so many neighbors is rather a big advantage. Maybe we won’t have expensive French wines, but there will definitely be foreign exchange earnings from the sale of gas to Germany. And they will buy our nickel and palladium.
Question: So you don’t believe that they will give up our gas within three years?
Sushentsov: I think we can rule out this scenario. There is no excess gas in the world, and it’s impossible to quickly increase its production in three years. In all the other regions of the world except the West, consumption is actively growing. Western consumption isn’t growing at the same rate as it does in India, China, and Africa. Also, Russian consumption, I think, will grow because of restrictions on investment from the West. In general, these resources will not be found elsewhere in the world. And the demand for them is growing.
… In three years, it will be difficult to explain to a German citizen why he has have to pay twice as much for gas as before, because the Ukrainian crisis was three years ago already. …
So far, our colleagues in the West have proved only their high ideology and willingness to sacrifice theatrically for a short time. Like putting someone’s flag on your avatar on social networks for a week or two. Then you get into another mood and change your avatar back. Life suggests that a form of mutually acceptable economic exchange in the energy sector will resume between us, designed, for them, to chiefly to relieve the stress pressure on the European electorate.
Question: What else in our relations with Europe will be restored? How much do you think sanctions will be lifted off of Russia after the end of the active phase of the special military operation in Ukraine?
It is possible to partially—and at the same time, not soon—lift certain sanctions that complicate the lives of Europeans themselves. This applies to the areas of energy, food exchange, production chains that are broken now, the purchases of Russian goods and natural resources that they absolutely need.
I believe that from a certain perspective transport links, including aviation, are also normalizing. This is economically desirable for the European countries themselves. Otherwise, Europeans will create conditions for themselves for double-digit inflation and major social unrest.
Now, the words of European politicians sound bravura. Like, “We’ll endure it all—we’ll crank the knob and sleep in our jackets!” But here’s the question: Who has more patience? And who is less used to consumer civilization—us or them? For them, what’s happening is the total breakdown of their lifestyle, and for us, just another episode of belt-tightening in the long history of tightening them. …
Question: … Is Moscow, from your point of view, wise to manage its limited resources the way it has in recent weeks? Has it not made a monumental strategic miscalculation?
Sushentsov: A good strategy—one that pursues a clearly defined and vital goal—is based on the correct calculation of the resources necessary to achieve this goal and a correct analysis of the external environment.
Now we are witnessing a clash of the strategies of all the participants in this situation: Russia, Ukraine, the West. A kind of full-scale experiment. We will be able to assess the results of the first phase of the crisis—whose strategy is more effective?—by the end of this year. Why only the first phase? Because we are witnessing the very first stage of the beginning of a spring of big changes—from Ukraine to global monetary, financial and technological changes.
So we had to kick off this spring, at least in the case of Ukraine?
The peculiarity of Ukraine is that it is the only border country in Europe that has a dangerous potential for us—a big population, large armed forces with modern weapons, a lot of social energy and a strong ideological motivation to counter Russia.
Ukraine is an analogue of Pakistan in the India-Pakistan mix. These two countries were born simultaneously during the collapse of the British Empire. For Pakistan, confrontation with India was a formative experience that determined the nature of the country’s domestic policy, the central role of the military and military intelligence, its nuclear weapons programs, the training of terrorists to commit sabotage acts in India, the constant local border wars with India, and the special nature of foreign policy alliances.
In this metaphor, we see a lot of Ukraine. In fact, Russia is now preventively eliminating this potential Pakistan, which is a constant source of tension for India and to which it’s forced constantly to devote attention and resources. A demilitarized Ukraine, which, I hope, will lose the desire to actively oppose Russian interests, will eliminate this important point of tension in Europe.
Won’t there be a lot of new, even more dangerous points of tension in its place?
The new security system in Europe will indeed be based on mutual hostility. But this will be the species of hostility that rules out provocative and dangerous behavior. Such behavior is possible only in a situation where you don’t believe that the other side will answer your provocation with something. Now, that conviction is no more.
On the one hand, this will lead to an increase in the military expenditures of European states and a change in the geography of NATO’s forward basing, forces, and funding. They will be closer to our borders. But on the other hand, there they’ll take more responsibility for those forces’ behavior. Any incident might provoke a crisis that is not in the vital interests of these states. The result of such a system of checks and balances will be a more stable world.
Are you sure there will be more stability in the world now? Can you prove it?
Suppose, for example, that within a short time Ukraine were to develop a dirty nuclear bomb. At the same time, the growth of its army would continue in full swing. And after a while, it wouldn’t be 90,000 well-armed soldiers in the fortified area in the east of the country, but about 300,000.
Ukraine is a large country with a population of more than 40 million people. The military budget is about 6 percent of GDP. This level of military spending is comparable to Israel. It was a state in which the process of militarization was in full swing. Weapons came from the West on a large scale, Western military instructors trained the best Ukrainian units.
Several hundred thousand people—young men with combat experience—passed through the so-called ATO in Donbass. The Ukrainian army was the third largest in Europe after the Russian and Turkish army. They haven’t given up the goal of regaining the Donbass and Crimea militarily. Constant statements: “We are developing a missile program and targeting missiles at Moscow!” “It’s a pity that we gave away nuclear weapons, we need to get them back!”
I can’t believe that America would allow them to get them back.
If you follow your logic, Israel wouldn’t have nuclear weapons now. In fact, now their official position boils down to two mutually exclusive theses: “We do not have nuclear weapons, but if necessary, we will use them.” Ukraine could take a similar ambiguous position. And the West would lift its hands and say: “This is, of course, a violation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, but what can we do—especially against the background of the Russian threat. It’s a deterrent weapon!
According to his bio,
Andrey Sushentsov is an EASI-Hurford Next Generation fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace focused on Russian policy toward Ukraine and the future of Russian-Ukrainian interdependence. ….
Sushentsov was a visiting researcher at Georgetown University’s Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies in 2007 and at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in 2008. He was a visiting professor at Rome LUISS University in 2013 and at Armenian State University of Economics in 2014. He is participating in a Working Group on the Future of US-Russia Relations established by Higher School of Economics (Moscow) and Harvard University.
Isn’t that whole interview interesting. I learned more about Russia, how it views itself, why it’s doing what it’s doing, how it views the West, and what this suggests for our foreign policy than I could in a lifetime of reading the New York Times’ columnists.
On the other hand, here’s filmmaker Karen Shakhnazarov, a frequent guest on Russia’s propaganda outlets and the most loyal of Putinists, allowing that things aren’t going so well:
And more:
(He’s referring to the humiliating 2006 Khasavyurt agreement, which ended the first Chechen war.)
Kamil Galeev (again) has a fascinating and well-informed thread explaining how badly sanctions are damaging the Russian warmaking machine and why the Russian military is so severely underperforming expectations.
Americas
NBC poll finds Americans worried about gas prices, conflict with Russia:
According to the poll, 83 percent of respondents say they are concerned about the war causing a spike in prices for goods and services, such as gasoline. Nearly as many, 82 percent, worry that the war could eventually involve nuclear weapons, while nearly three-quarters of Americans say they fear U.S. combat troops could end up fighting in Ukraine.
Europe
France’s TotalEnergies “unable to end” Russian gas purchases. “Without Russian gas, you stop part of the European economy ... If we stop Russian gas we know that in winter 2023 we have a problem; in January we’d have to ration gas use, not for households but probably for industry,” he said.
“Hundreds participate in demo of shame in Bonn.”
Ukraine war ushers in Europe’s new normal. The aid that NATO will offer Ukraine is limited. What will be the result of this war in Europe? The military alliance has to think of the future and boost its defenses, says DW’s Bernd Riegert.
When the Russian ruler's war of aggression eventually ends, NATO will have to allow Russia and allies like Belarus to disappear again behind an Iron Curtain. The new world order that Vladimir Putin is forcing upon the West will be shaped by containment and isolation of the hazard.
The big question for NATO and the West will be what to do with China? The Communist dictatorship there seems to be going in the same direction as Putin's Russia. Accordingly, the state that could soon become the world's largest economy might also have to be contained and isolated.
The United States and Europe will have to become less independent on a country that has served for decades as a place to produce goods cheaply, a place to sell their products, and a supplier of crucial commodities.
It amounts to deglobalization, a dismantling of the international network that has been desired and promoted over the past 40 years.
Estonia’s Interior Minister warned that Russia’s influence operations have “significantly” increased in recent weeks. Russia is reportedly recruiting spies to assess how easy it is to penetrate the Estonian border.
NATO extends Jens Stoltenberg’s mandate.
Most citizens of Ireland want to boost military spending and nearly half want to join NATO.
Six of ten Swedes back joining Nato if Finland does.
“Finland will join NATO”—former Finnish prime minister.
Why Putin’s invasion hasn’t yet succeeded—but why it still might. Initial battle successes don’t win a war. The most critical juncture of the war will arrive soon, in about two weeks, when a burned-out Russian military will need to mount a major resupply effort in order to keep going. … Social media is giving us a distorted view of what’s actually taking place on the ground.
The Zeitenwende: Has Germany changed?
Four weeks after the proclaimed “turning point,” the Chancellor has again largely dropped out of public sight and Germany seems to be trying to return to the world that “used to be” before the Russian attack on Ukraine brought so much unpleasant talk about high fuel prices, the need to find new energy suppliers and concerns about prosperity. Unsurprisingly perhaps, there remains a strong urge to return to the certainties of the world as it was …
… The steps that might end the war have not yet been taken. An energy embargo, which would drastically increase the price of Putin’s military offensive, is being strongly resisted by the government, which fears it might cause a recession. Military aid, which the German Ministry of Defense does not fully publicize, is very far from US or UK levels of help, especially regarding air defense equipment. …
Yes, the Zeitenwende speech broke some taboos in German foreign policy, but so far these are only enough to soothe the German conscience. Economic opportunism has not yet been overcome either. Strategic thinking has yet to establish itself in the body politic.
Westminster Russia Forum quietly delays networking events. The group formerly known as Conservative Friends of Russia tells members its events are “TBC Subject to Ongoing Conflict in Ukraine.” (If you listened to our podcast with Michael Weiss, you’ll remember who they are.
This war, democracies and the fate of populism (In Italian)
United in words, divided in deeds. So we end up playing the enemy’s game. While in Ukraine he destroys lives and cities, Putin in the West is betting on our weaknesses. He identifies the cracks in the Euro-Atlantic wall and slips into them to widen them. Why is he being tough in Italy, threatening ministers and denouncing newspapers, while he is softer with the other chancelleries? He knows well that here the murky Russophilic marsh is more abundant with fish, because he himself has been feeding it in the days of the yellow-green government. For the League, the Moscow Metropol is not just a beautiful Art Nouveau hotel built before the Bolshevik Revolution. For the Five Stars, “From Russia with love” is not just the second chapter of the James Bond saga. We Italians should forget and make us forget these black pages of our history forever, when we risked handing over the keys of our democracy to a Russian dictator and a Chinese emperor. But above all we should realize that from Kiev to Lviv, from Mariupol to Odessa, a game is underway that will forever upset the rules of the game, on a local and global scale.
How the comic Italian guerricciola will end, inside the tragic Ukrainian war, is difficult to say. But in a year we vote. The outcome of the conflict promises to be devastating on the economic and social front: inflation and recession, rationed energy and Sundays on foot, food shortages and universal poverty. Amid the war rubble, we can glimpse the dramatic “after” of which Tacitus wrote: “They make a desert, and they call it peace.” A desert made of fear, discomfort, social anger. And however confused, faded, battered—cricket-league populism seems ready to cross it.2
Polish PM: a 10-point plan to save Ukraine.
Together with Slovenia and the Czech Republic, we have prepared a list of actions the EU must enforce if it really wants to end the war.
Cut off all Russian banks from the SWIFT international payment system. Otherwise, the Russian economy will adapt to the new conditions within a few weeks.
Put in place a common asylum policy for Russian soldiers who refuse to serve the criminal regime in Moscow.
Completely stop Russian propaganda in Europe.
Block Russian ships from our ports.
Block road transport in and out of Russia.
Impose sanctions not only on oligarchs but their entire business environment.
Suspend visas for all Russian citizens who want to enter the EU.
Impose sanctions on all members of Putin’s party, United Russia.
Put in place a total ban on the export to Russia of technologies that can be used for war.
Exclude Russia from all international organizations.
If this does not stop the war, then we must go further. In Kyiv, we proposed a peacekeeping mission under the aegis of NATO and other international organizations. If we cannot introduce effective sanctions, we have no choice: We must protect the people of Ukraine with our own shields.
Turkey defuses stray naval mines in Bosporus.
Will this be Serbia’s dirtiest election yet?
The Guardian: Biden’s Putin ad-lib should focus west on what its endgame should be. “Analysis: Any unseating of Russia’s president is that country’s business, not that of the US president.”3
Belief in conspiracy theories as a function of French voter intentions:
If you missed it yesterday, you can listen to our French Election Twitter Summit here.
Ukraine
We are fighting for the right to have a future. Ignorance, prejudice, naivety: the West helped prepare the ground for Putin’s war, says Ukrainian historian Olesya Khromeychuk. Before he died in action in the Donbas in 2017, her brother Volodya warned her that the war would escalate.
I haven’t yet listened to it, but Christy Quirk highly recommended this podcast: The massive aid flowing into Ukraine.
Middle East
Saudi foreign minister: “It was mentioned that Mariupol is Europe’s Aleppo. Well, Aleppo was our Aleppo.”
Africa
Bangui hails Russian “saviors” of Central Africa:
“The Russians have always been there on our side,” claimed Yefi Kezza, a member of Touadera’s United Hearts Movement (MCU) and also of the National Galaxy Platform, which organised the tribute and vilifies France and the UN.
“The Russians came and did a remarkable job to liberate the Central African people,” added Blaise-Didacien Kossimatchi, another member of the National Galaxy Platform.
Several demonstrators sported T-shirts stamped “I am Wagner” …
We’ll treat the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and the Americas more thoroughly tomorrow.
By the Cosmopolitan Globalists
Cristina Maza wrote about the debate in Congress over how to help Ukraine impose its own no-fly zone and what it would entail. She also wrote about Ukrainians mobilizing to win the information war. She also joined Julie Mason to discuss what Biden’s statement of a “response in kind” to potential chemical weapons attacks actually means.
David Patrikarakos writes, Russia will never want peace.
Since Russian tanks and men swarmed across the border on 24 February, we’ve been wrenched back in time. What is happening on the battlefields of Ukraine is something we haven’t seen for over half a century anywhere the Western media really cares about. This is not the tit-for-tat killings between psychotic paramilitaries that was Yugoslavia. It’s not the cave battle of Tora Bora, and it’s most certainly not the counterinsurgency of Iraq. It is two armies facing off in the field; lines of tanks chewing up the sodden earth; phalanxes of soldiers marching step by step; bawling air raid sirens and, of course, bombed out cities mottled with dead kids.
I believe that what is being hammered out right now on the battlefields of Ukraine is not just its future and Russia’s, but the West’s, too. If the Ukrainians had folded after 72 hours or however long Putin’s lick-spittles told him the “special police operation” would take, then the Spetsnaz and gangs of Kadyrovite scumbags would be halfway to Georgia and Moldova by now. Half the east would now be gone and a new Iron Curtain, though perhaps this time a gold one embossed with the Versace logo, would be descending from Tbilisi to Minsk.
Miscellaneous
I include this in much the same spirit as I might an astrology column: Letter from the FSB songbird: Putin’s plan to reframe the war as a religious World War III. The songbird predicts an effort to switch narratives. “Russia’s war against Nazism” will become an “international war to protect the Orthodoxy.” This might involve a gambit in Armenia—“a terrorist threat, presumably,” which would ideally leave “a Turkish-Kosovo trail,” leading to “a Serbian offensive in Kosovo, triggering a broad front for territorial redistribution with Hungary getting involved to partition Ukraine.” Canada, too, may be the focus of “demonstrative destabilization.” And Russia is trying to goad China into invading Taiwan, but the Chinese are just too savvy. (Someone described these letters to me as QAnon for people who play Risk.)
Ancient Hebrew ‘Curse Tablet’ discovered at Joshua’s Altar on Mt. Ebal.
“A revolutionary artifact with several lines of text ‘centuries older than any known Hebrew inscription from Israel’—and paralleling several scriptures regarding Israel’s entry into Canaan.”
Sorry, honey:
If that sounds vaguely familiar, it might be because that’s where Tucker Carlson’s Russia expert Clint Erlich was groomed.
From our faithful reader in Italy, I.E. Oogiook: “La Stampa is providing the most thoughtful coverage of the war. It’s a classical values paper, not as big and flashy as La Repubblica, but solid in the best sense of the word. They’re currently being sued by Russia for running an article wondering aloud if the only solution is for someone to knock Putin off ... Too many Italians still think this is “a terrible war in Ukraine that won't affect us (i.e., ‘me’) much.” I think [editorialist Massimo] Giannini’s take is much closer to the truth that will inevitably dawn, and quite soon. A dozen years ago, the major manufacturers of pasta tried to raise the price of their basic products, only slightly, as I recall, and the uproar was instant and so dramatic that they backed down in a “just kidding” kinda way. This will be, uh, much worse ... If they make the connection between the soon to come new price of pasta and Putin, his acolytes and apologists will be binned. That leaves one party standing in the lonely center.”
Signore Oogiook sent us this item, too. “I just can't stand this crap,” he wrote. “Almost every line is risible. The attempt to insist on equivalencies between all nations is beyond contempt ... they understand nothing, or they’re afraid to understand anything.” (It’s true that the columnist’s proposal—“ideally, [Putin] is defeated in elections”—suggests he’s out of his depth.)
I can’t like this enough:
[Saudi foreign minister: “It was mentioned that Mariupol is Europe’s Aleppo. Well, Aleppo was our Aleppo.”]
Indeed.
Andrey Sushentsov might have provided the most enraging read I've had in weeks. In each answer he kept trying to outdo himself from the last statement.
I had to put my phone down for a moment at, "In fact, Russia is now preventively eliminating this potential Pakistan."