I saw that part about BASF being in China since 1885 and thought, well, their relations with the Chinese haven’t necessarily been cooperative the entire time. I’m wondering how much German guilt is playing into this, as they behaved exceptionally barbarically during the Boxer Rebellion.
Maybe there would be no neo-Nazis in the Bundestag if Merkel hadn't marginalized the conservative wing of the CDU. A purely Höcke-ian AfD would be a splinter party consistently staying under 5%. Merkel's intents are not always mysterious, but there is a far cry between intents and results, much as with Trump.
How much does the deal allow for Germany picking and choosing what parts of its industry are for sale? Over the last few years, much of Europe has come to the conclusion that, say, telecommunications and gas pipelines are best left in national hands. Does the deal make it easier or harder to enforce this? This is the sort of questions that make it a good or bad deal. As to human rights in China, I suspect Europe wouldn't be doing much about them either way (besides, I hope, harboring dissidents -- something Merkel has set a surprisingly good example for in the case of Navalny); the deal is probably just putting a good face on it.
I think Europe *would* be doing something about human rights in China if it had any idea how to do it. So would the US. But we're talking about a country with nuclear weapons and the world's largest economy. The only strategy that makes sense is a US-led alliance of a revivified TPP, plus Europe. I don't think we'll be able to do it, though: We've gone too far off the deep end. I hope we surprise ourselves.
I think granting visas to Hong-Kongers (as Britain appears to be doing) would be a good low-hanging fruit to pick up.
As to Xinjiang, in theory, sanctions (a la Crimea) could work. In practice, I'm afraid it would only cause Western companies to pull out of Xinjiang while Chinese companies wouldn't care (and would be too big to sanction).
I saw that part about BASF being in China since 1885 and thought, well, their relations with the Chinese haven’t necessarily been cooperative the entire time. I’m wondering how much German guilt is playing into this, as they behaved exceptionally barbarically during the Boxer Rebellion.
The deal has stunning concessions by the People's Republic of China in favor of the EU.
Well, of course it does. It's a _first_ deal. Think street corner dealer giving away free samples.
The PRC plays a better long game than the West. Successful tyrannies generally play better long games than republican democracies.
Eric Hines
Maybe there would be no neo-Nazis in the Bundestag if Merkel hadn't marginalized the conservative wing of the CDU. A purely Höcke-ian AfD would be a splinter party consistently staying under 5%. Merkel's intents are not always mysterious, but there is a far cry between intents and results, much as with Trump.
How much does the deal allow for Germany picking and choosing what parts of its industry are for sale? Over the last few years, much of Europe has come to the conclusion that, say, telecommunications and gas pipelines are best left in national hands. Does the deal make it easier or harder to enforce this? This is the sort of questions that make it a good or bad deal. As to human rights in China, I suspect Europe wouldn't be doing much about them either way (besides, I hope, harboring dissidents -- something Merkel has set a surprisingly good example for in the case of Navalny); the deal is probably just putting a good face on it.
I think Europe *would* be doing something about human rights in China if it had any idea how to do it. So would the US. But we're talking about a country with nuclear weapons and the world's largest economy. The only strategy that makes sense is a US-led alliance of a revivified TPP, plus Europe. I don't think we'll be able to do it, though: We've gone too far off the deep end. I hope we surprise ourselves.
I think granting visas to Hong-Kongers (as Britain appears to be doing) would be a good low-hanging fruit to pick up.
As to Xinjiang, in theory, sanctions (a la Crimea) could work. In practice, I'm afraid it would only cause Western companies to pull out of Xinjiang while Chinese companies wouldn't care (and would be too big to sanction).