Note: I’ll be sending remarks on the Turkish elections separately.
Summary A: The newsletter provides an overview of recent events and developments in the Middle East. It starts with the US increasing its military presence in the region after Iran seized tankers. The US 5th Fleet announced an increase in ships and aircraft patrolling the Strait of Hormuz. The newsletter also covers the ongoing conflict between Israel and Palestine, with rocket attacks and airstrikes taking place. There have been casualties on both sides, including the death of an Israeli woman and numerous civilians in Gaza. The newsletter highlights the diplomatic efforts to reach a ceasefire and the involvement of the US in urging Israel to end its operation. It also discusses the role of Palestinian Islamic Jihad and its relationship with Hamas. The international community's response to the conflict, including calls for a ceasefire and concerns about the humanitarian situation in Gaza, is mentioned. The newsletter touches on various other topics, such as US lawmakers introducing a bill to deter normalization with Assad, the situation in Yemen, Bahrain's suspension of changes to its curriculum linked to Israel, and UAE-China nuclear deals. Finally, there is a discussion about the evolving energy relationship between Saudi Arabia and China, as well as the gendered brain drain from the Middle East.
Summary B: The US is bolstering its military presence in the Gulf in response to Iran’s seizure of tankers in the Strait of Hormuz. Conflict between Israel and Palestine intensifies, with both sides suffering casualties from rockets and bombs, including four children in Gaza killed by failed Islamic Jihad rocket launches. Egyptian efforts to secure a ceasefire have collapsed. US lawmakers introduce a bill aimed at discouraging normalization with Assad’s regime in Syria. Saudi Arabia strengthens its energy ties with China through nuclear energy deals. Bahrain suspends curriculum changes linked to normalizing relations Israel. Iran is still sending weapons and drugs to Yemen despite diplomatic normalization with the Saudis. And the region is suffering a gendered brain drain as women try to get the hell out of there. Stay informed about these significant events and their implications in our concise newsletter, offering a well-informed perspective on the challenges facing the region.
US boosts military presence in the Middle East after Iran seizes tankers. Iran has “no justification for these actions,” National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby said:
The announcement comes after Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps seized a Panama-flagged oil tanker called Niovi on May 3, as the ship was traveling through the Strait of Hormuz. The tanker left Dubai, and moved toward a UAE port when a dozen boats from the IRGC navy forced the tanker to head into Iranian waters. Another incident occurred April 27, when the Advantage Sweet tanker ship belonging to the Marshall Islands was also seized after colliding with an Iranian boat, which injured several crew members, according to Iran’s state media.
The US 5th Fleet announced that it was increasing the rotation of ships and aircraft patrolling in and around the Straight of Hormuz:
The statement read that the 5th Fleet will also bolster international maritime security collaboration. “Iran’s unwarranted, irresponsible and unlawful seizure and harassment of merchant vessels must stop,” said Vice Adm. Brad Cooper, commander of the US Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT), US 5th Fleet and Combined Maritime Forces. According to the 5th Fleet, Iran has harassed, attacked or interfered with the navigational rights of fifteen internationally flagged merchant vessels over the past two years. Separately, the US military said this week that they seized over US$100 million worth of methamphetamine and heroin on fishing vessels in the Gulf of Oman that had departed from Iran.
Islamic Jihad fires rockets at Ashdod, Ashkelon, border towns. There have been no immediate reports of injuries.
IDF hits Gaza targets. The IDF says it has carried out airstrikes against another two Palestinian Islamic Jihad command centers in the Gaza Strip. Earlier, the IDF struck two similar command centers, housed in residential buildings. Yesterday, four such command centers were hit. The IDF says it warned occupants to clear the area before carrying out the strike.
Headquarters of senior Islamic Jihad operatives targeted by Israel overnight. The headquarters of Muhammed Abu al-Ata were destroyed, but he wasn’t there: According to the IDF, he’s fled and taken up residence in a hospital.
Four civilians in Gaza, including two teenagers and a ten-year-old girl, have been killed by failed Islamic Jihad rocket launches. Since the beginning of Operation Shield and Arrow, 108 rocket launches by Islamic Jihad from the Gaza Strip toward Israel have failed and fallen short, exploding inside the Gaza Strip.
An 80-year-old Israeli woman in Rehovat (near Tel Aviv) was killed by a rocket as she tried to help her paralyzed husband reach shelter. Others were injured:
“Grandpa was probably stressed and grandma tried to help him get up. It was difficult for him to move because his leg was amputated and he is partially paralyzed after a car accident,” the relative said. … “I don’t know what my grandfather will do without her. He communicated only with her. She was his whole life. There was a love between them that you don’t see every day,” he said. The direct hit blew a massive hole in the Avramyam’s apartment on the third story of a building in Rehovot, a city of 150,000 some 45 kilometers north of Gaza, raining rubble on the street below.
Gaza strike kills deputy commander of Islamic Jihad rocket forces:
An Israeli airstrike in the Gaza Strip on Thursday afternoon killed a senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad member, dealing another blow to the group in the latest round of hostilities and further dampening hopes for a ceasefire. The airstrike in the southern Gaza town of Bani Suheila, near Khan Younis, killed Ahmad Abu Daqqa, the deputy commander of Islamic Jihad’s rocket forces, the Israel Defense Forces and Shin Bet security agency said in a statement. Abu Daqqa was the deputy of Ali Ghali, the head of the Islamic Jihad rocket forces, who was killed in a separate Israeli strike early Thursday morning. …
IDF spokesman Rear Admiral Daniel Hagarai [said] that the military had been watching Abu Daqqa for two days before targeting him. “We were waiting for him to be separated from the family he used as a human shield,” Hagari said.
Israel, Islamic Jihad weigh “improved” Egyptian offer for ceasefire amid a lull in rocket fire from Gaza last night.
[There was] no agreements on the new proposal, with Israelis considering whether to even re-enter talks on a cessation of hostilities, which have raged since Tuesday. … Islamic Jihad is also dissatisfied with the Egyptian proposal, which according to Palestinian sources, calls for a ceasefire without further commitments from Israel to drop its pursuit of the terror group’s leaders.
Update: Rocket fire continues; truce talks suspended; Israel warns of “significant” response.
Hamas says that a ceasefire will be reached once Israel stops carrying out “atrocities” in the Gaza Strip.
US signals to Israel to end Gaza operation, reach ceasefire:
The Biden administration is signaling to Israel to reach a ceasefire and end its ongoing operation in the Gaza Strip, as talks between Israel and the Palestinians, mediated by Egypt, Qatar and the UN, continue. … The Biden administration is concerned that the fighting in Gaza will expand into a multi-front conflict including missiles being launched at Israel from Lebanon or Syria, as happened last month. The White House is also worried that with a weakened Palestinian Authority, an escalation might occur in the West Bank or Jerusalem.
Defense Minister Yoav Gallant tells US defense chief Lloyd Austin that Israel is prepared for long campaign in Gaza. Pentagon reaffirms “ironclad” US support for Israel, urges deescalation, as UK, France and Germany condemn rocket barrages against southern cities.
Ben Gvir solves his own coalition crisis, leveraging Gaza op to pump up his base. Ending his political boycott, national security minister uses offensive against Islamic Jihad, which he did not plan, to slide back into a coalition unwilling to meet his demands:
On Tuesday, Ben Gvir agreed to end his far-right Otzma Yehudit party’s boycott of government activity, cheering on the Israeli offensive that started when the military assassinated three senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad leaders in Gaza. Ben Gvir had launched the boycott six days earlier to protest Israel’s “feeble” response to 104 rockets fired from the Gaza Strip at the country’s south last week.
But a day before Ben Gvir’s boycott, according to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and others, Israel’s political leadership and military officials had already agreed to launch the Gaza operation. In other words, the military response was in motion before Otzma Yehudit stepped out on the coalition, undermining the claim that pressure from Ben Gvir and his allies had prompted the offensive.
The Palestinian Islamic Jihad has become a problem not only for Israel, but for Hamas too:
The Palestinian Islamic Jihad organization may have lost some of its top military commanders during the latest round of fighting with Israel, but its status as the second-largest armed group in the Gaza Strip after Hamas remains intact. In fact, some Palestinians believe that each round of fighting with Israel props up PIJ’s standing as a dominant player not only in the Gaza Strip, but in the West Bank as well. … PIJ is now being praised by many Palestinians and Arabs as the only “resistance” faction that is not afraid to fire hundreds of rockets at Israel. Most of those who are heaping praise on PIJ are, on the other hand, criticizing Hamas for sitting on the fence and refusing to be directly involved in the fighting against Israel. … Hamas has never been comfortable with the idea that another major armed group is functioning as a “state within a state” in the Gaza Strip. This discontent has often created tensions between the two Iranian-backed groups.
Gaza death toll reaches at least 29 with no end in sight. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu says offensive will take as long as necessary:
… While the Israeli offensive is the largest conducted since last year, the reaction from the international community has been quieter in comparison to previous years. The European Union said it was dismayed at the killing of Palestinian children and called for a comprehensive ceasefire to be established immediately. UN secretary general Antonio Guterres condemned the killing of civilians in Gaza as “unacceptable” and appealed for them to “stop immediately.” The Arab League also slammed the “barbaric Israeli raids on the Gaza Strip, which targeted civilians, children, and women in residential neighborhoods.”
Humanitarian groups have meanwhile been warning of a crisis in Gaza due in part to Israeli bombing as well as Israel's ongoing closure of crossings for the fourth day in a row. The Palestine Red Crescent Society has appealed to international organisations to pressure Israel into creating a humanitarian corridor for the entry of essential medical supplies and humanitarian aid. “This comes due to the deterioration of humanitarian conditions in the Strip, where Israeli occupation checkpoints and barriers surrounding the Gaza Strip remain closed for the fourth day in a row.”
Claire—like the EU, I’m dismayed by the killing of children, be it by PIJ rockets or Israeli bombs. But also like the EU, I’ve otherwise got little sympathy. If they don’t like being bombed, they should have thought of that before lobbing those rockets.
Palestinians in state of horror:
In addition to the more than two dozen deaths, the air strikes in Gaza have led to major damage to civilian infrastructure and left many homeless. A hospital in central Gaza had been damaged as a result of a strike on a house next to it. And the Gaza Electricity Authority warned the area could face critical power outages within 72 hours due to a lack of diesel fuel for the sole power plant in the enclave. Israel has completely closed the crossings connecting it to Gaza since Tuesday, halting the entry of essential goods into the coastal enclave. Gaza already suffers from a “chronic electricity deficit” due to the blockade that has been imposed for more than fifteen years, resulting in increasing fragile living conditions for the population, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
This is self-imposed. There would be nothing easier than making this stop. All Israelis want from Gaza is that it not be a source of bombs, rockets, and suicide bombers. (Yes, there are lunatics who will say they want the territory back, but they’re truly insignificant.) I’m not insensate: I feel terrible for children who are caught up in this.
Attempts at grand strategy with no real endgame:
There has been a small bit of grand strategy by the current government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the former government of Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid. Both governments have continued to support the policy of Qatar handing over tens of millions of dollars per month to Gaza (translation: Hamas) and mostly supported increasing the number of worker permits for Gaza to 17,000. These are techniques to mix some “carrots” with some “sticks” to incentivize Gaza to prefer stability over war. But this is at most a medium-term strategy. It neither leads the Palestinians as a whole, in both the West Bank and Gaza, substantially closer to real diplomacy and a final much-longer-term ceasefire, nor does it bring Israel closer to being able to use military means to coerce Hamas into such a longer-term ceasefire by virtue of a deeper land invasion.
Many diplomats and some Israeli security officials believe bigger economic incentives to Hamas, an artificial seaport and larger foreign investment for industrial zones, could lead to a 10-year or longer hudna, or ceasefire. Alternatively, many top security officials have argued for a temporary invasion of a few weeks or a few months, followed by a prompt withdrawal and handing Gaza back to some mix of the PA and an international force. This would not be a move to reconquer, but just to clean out enough of Hamas’s weaponry and leaders so that someone other than Israel could take control. Both of these options have been called unrealistic and have been said to have previously failed in other time periods. However, if either of them worked, it would not only gain a longer period of quiet, it would also reduce Iranian influence on Israel’s borders. And after the long list of conflicts since 2006, and with Iran’s hand becoming more, not less, threatening to Israel, maybe gambling on something that failed in a different time period and context might not look as bad. None of the top political officials trying to lead the country are seriously talking about any of these broader options. For the last several years, the country has been consumed by the pro-/anti-Netanyahu debate.
Israel can turn Iran’s multi-theater conflagration strategy into an advantage. It’s time to take the initiative on Iran:
There is no doubt that Iran has been, at least partially, behind almost all recent attacks on Israel in the south, in the north, and in the east, through Hamas, Hezbollah, and its forces in Syria. Its goal is to push Israel into a confrontation on four or even five fronts: Lebanon, Syria, Gaza, Judea and Samaria, and Jerusalem.
Now is the time to implement one of the major changes in Israel's national security strategy that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu began in 2017-2018—by punishing not only those who attack Israel directly, as the IDF and Shin Bet have done in recent days against the PIJ in Gaza—but also the actors who fund and send them under the expectation that they would be treated with impunity: i.e. Iran. The punishment does not have to be immediate or direct, as this could have the region spiral into all-out war. There are many ways to punish and weaken Iran indirectly, including from the inside by, for example, supporting the protesters taking to the streets of the Islamic Republic.
Claire—I’m very surprised to read that Israel isn’t already doing so. The author previously served as Netanyahu’s national security advisor and acting head of the National Security Council, so if he says that they aren’t, he’s probably right. (Although who knows: The article may be intended to send some kind of message.) In any event, supporting the protesters is a moral imperative—for every nation, not just Israel—irrespective of strategic advantage.
The European Union is deeply concerned by the grave escalation of violence in recent days in Israel and the occupied Palestinian territory. The EU is deeply alarmed by this new round of violence and the deteriorating security situation in the occupied Palestinian territories and Israel, and by on-going developments in and around Gaza, which has claimed unacceptable civilian casualties including children. We urge an immediate comprehensive ceasefire which will end Israeli military operations in Gaza and current rocket firing against Israel, which is unacceptable. International humanitarian law must be respected.
How Anadolu Agency, the Turkish state news agency, reported this:
“It has been over twelve years since the Syrian revolution against the brutal Assad regime began. Supported by war criminal Putin and the terrorist Mullahs in Tehran, over half a million people have been slaughtered by this criminal regime, and over half the Syrian population has been displaced. Countries choosing to normalize with the unrepentant mass murderer and drug trafficker, Bashar al-Assad, are headed down the wrong path. The Assad regime is illegitimate and poses a threat to peace and prosperity in the region.”
— Joe Wilson (R-SC)
US lawmakers introduce bill to deter normalization with Assad:
US Congressmen introduced the “Assad Anti-Normalization Act”, a bill that seeks to hold the government of Bashar al-Assad accountable for its crimes against the Syrian people, sanctioning any investment in territories controlled by the Syrian leader and deterring normalization. ... The bill, which was introduced on Thursday, comes just days after Arab League foreign ministers adopted a decision to readmit Syria after more than a decade of suspension. …
If passed, the legislation would require a five-year annual strategy to counter normalization with the Assad government by countries that have “taken steps to normalize with the Assad regime.” It would also prohibit any federal government agency from normalizing with Assad's government. The legislation will require an immediate review of Caesar Act sanctions for any grants of US$50,000 or more to Syria, as well as expanding the Caesar Act.
Claire—good for them.
The IDF has apologized for first time for the death of Al Jazeera journalist Shireen Abu Akleh, a year to the day after she was killed while covering an Israeli military operation in the West Bank.
The size and opulence of a new US embassy complex is offending many in Lebanon, where nearly 80 percent of the population lives below the poverty line:
Located some 13 kilometers from the center of Beirut, the US’ new embassy compound in Lebanon looks like a city of its own. Sprawling over a 43-acre site, the complex in the Beirut suburb of Awkar is almost two-and-a-half times the size of the land the White House sits on and more than 21 soccer fields. Many Lebanese on Twitter questioned why the US needs such a large embassy in their capital. Lebanon is smaller than Connecticut and has a population of just six million. Few American tourists go to the country as the State Department has placed it on the third highest travel advisory level, but it does have a sizable population of Lebanese-American residents. “Did the US move to Lebanon??”
Iranian Finance Minister Ehsan Khandouzi led an economic delegation to Saudi Arabia in the first official visit since the Chinese-brokered deal.
China and Russia encourage Iran to go nuclear. An aloof US leaves a regional vacuum that the Islamic Republic is exploiting brilliantly:
For far too long, the Western foreign-policy establishment has gained comfort from the notion that Russia and China didn’t want a nuclear Iran. But Vladimir Putin would have no objections to a nuclear crisis in the Middle East if it diverted attention from his war in Ukraine. Unlike the US, Russia has lived with nuclear-armed states on its periphery for decades. The only thing new about an Iranian bomb would be the convulsive shock it would deliver to US interests in the Middle East and beyond. For twenty years, American administrations have insisted that Iran would never be allowed to go nuclear. When it does, what’s left of America’s writ in the Middle East will evaporate.
Iran supplying weapons and drugs to Yemen despite restoration of diplomatic ties with Saudi Arabia, says the US Special Envoy for Yemen:
The Chinese-brokered accord reached in March, talks between Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s Iran-aligned Houthis, and a ceasefire that largely has held despite expiring in October have boosted prospects for an end to the conflict. But, Lenderking [said], Iran is still supplying arms and drugs that help fuel the war that erupted in 2014 and has created one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises.
Bahrain to suspend changes to curriculum linked to Israel, normalization:
Bahrain’s educational institutions have been instructed to suspend changes made to the curricula that are “not compatible with Bahrain’s national values designed to protect religion and its core pillars,” upon direction from Prince Salman al-Khalifa, the crown prince and prime minister of the Gulf state. The announcement, reportedly in line with King Hamad al-Khalifa’s “commitment to protecting the Islamic religion,” came on Tuesday after some critics voiced issues with the inclusion of Israel and changes to the maps of the contested Israeli-Palestinian territories.
UAE-China nuclear deals signal evolving energy relationship:
The United Arab Emirates signed three agreements with Chinese nuclear energy organizations on Sunday, which experts believe is only the beginning of the nuclear energy goals for the country, and region. Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation, which is developing the UAE’s nuclear energy sector, signed memorandums of understanding with China’s Nuclear Power Operations Research Institute, the China National Nuclear Corporation Overseas, and the China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation. This takes place months before the UAE hosts the COP28 global climate summit this year, amid its strategy to shift 6 percent of its energy needs to nuclear to fulfill its net zero by 2050 plan.
Saudi Arabia is extremely popular in the Middle East. Mohammed bin Salman’s middle finger to Washington is burnishing Riyadh’s image:
According to the well-respected Arab Barometer, in Jordan, Saudi Arabia ranks second only to Turkey in the public’s approval. Nearly half of Tunisians view Saudi Arabia—along with France and Turkey—favorably. Iraqis favor Saudi Arabia more than any country except China, and Mohammed bin Salman is their favorite leader only after the United Arab Emirates’ president, Mohammed bin Zayed. … Overall, it seems that as Saudi Arabia pursues a foreign policy independent of Washington, people in the region see the country as an engine of prosperity and a regional stabilizer. It is almost the exact mirror image of how the kingdom is perceived in the West. It would behoove US officials and policymakers to take the polls and the reasons—however anecdotal they may be—for the kingdom’s popularity seriously.
A new foundation for the US-Saudi partnership:
For half a century, the special relationship between Washington and Riyadh has rested on an arrangement whereby the United States protects Saudi Arabia from foreign threats while the Saudis protect the Americans from instability in world oil markets. However, as the US inches closer to energy independence, its reliance on Saudi oil has diminished. Their original arrangement now seems less relevant. Yet Washington still has substantial influence over Riyadh that it can leverage to keep the kingdom out of China’s orbit.
Saudi Arabia should consider the “Just do it” strategy for normalizing ties with Israel:
This bargaining with the US over Israel roughly follows the model established by other states in coming to terms with Israel’s existence: Morocco obtaining US concessions on the Western Sahara; the United Arab Emirates getting better access to sophisticated US weapons; and, earlier, Egypt receiving massive US aid in exchange for a peace treaty with Israel. But this bargaining model is not the only way to approach the issue, and the Saudis could be better served by avoiding this indirect approach that will almost certainly yield uncertain results. With that in mind, the Saudis should examine the option of moving unilaterally to establish ties with Israel.
The direct unilateral approach carries three clear advantages for Saudi Arabia. The most important is that it would immediately and effectively address the goodwill deficit that the Kingdom suffers in Washington. A protracted public discussion in the United States about granting conditions to Saudi Arabia in connection with normalization is likely to be embarrassing and, at worst, will give little guarantee that US commitments, if provided, will be durable. … A second major advantage of a direct Saudi move with Israel would be the establishment of Saudi Arabia as the indispensable Arab power in the Middle East. … A third good reason for acting unilaterally is that it would send a clear message to Iran.
There’s a gendered brain drain from the Middle East. The feminization of migration flowing out of MENA is attributable to the limited career opportunities available to women at home. If this trend continues unrecognized and unaddressed, it will have major consequences for the regional economy and stall development.
Claire—it’s more than just limited career opportunities.
Correction: I wrote the day before yesterday that the civilians killed in the IAF’s opening strikes were the wives and children of the PIJ commanders. I was wrong. Some were their wives and children, but others were their neighbors.
Maybe the US Embassy in Lebanon needs to be larger to provide better security for the facility, i.e. fewer blind spots, fewer points where “protesters” can survey the grounds, fewer high points within reach of the core buildings? Just some thoughts. In related news, our local Maronite parish is having its annual Lebanese food festival next weekend, and I can’t wait.
I can’t change my vote apparently, but now that I have read the newsletters by geographic location, it is better separated into separate ones instead of one very very long one. Thanks