The article by James Timbie and Admiral James O. Ellis Jr. on a "porcupine" anti-invasion strategy for Taiwan was interesting and informative. It also showed that the more things change in the area of military art and science, the more they stay the same. What the authors are describing is essentially a form of defense in depth—which is nothing new. Among the many historical examples that can be cited there is the Battle of Kursk (July 1943), in which the Red Army used a layered, distributed defensive scheme to blunt and frustrate the German Army's last big offensive on the Eastern Front.
Given favorable terrain and sufficient resources, a defense in depth is the most effective defensive option. But it would be a mistake to conceive of it as a static defense, pure and simple; mobility remains important. Take, for example, an anti-armor defense based on small teams armed with antitank guided missiles. If such a team remains in one position, it will eventually be detected and eliminated. So a number of alternate positions must be identified for it, and the team must possess sufficient mobility to move among them.
Defense in depth also requires a sufficiently powerful and mobile reserve to conduct counterattacks against enemy penetrations. At Kursk, these counterattacks were conducted at every echelon of command, from the platoon to full divisions and corps, and eventually they transitioned to a major counteroffensive. In a Taiwan invasion scenario major counterattacks would probably be conducted by battalions and brigades, with the primary objective of maintaining the integrity of the overall defense.
Such a defense, operating in conjunction with air, missile and submarine attacks on the invader's seaborne communications with mainland China, would very likely prevent the People's Liberation Army from scoring a quick victory—which must obviously be its objective. For time would not be on the PLA's side. If the invasion were to bog down amid protracted fighting and increasing logistical problems, it would ultimately fail.
So the porcupine strategy—I would substitute the title "sponge-and-hammer strategy"—is probably Taiwan's best military option.
I want to suggest an article I was reading this weekend on the state of the newly launched James Webb Space Telescope. In short so far so good and more importantly many of the hardest tasks have now been finished for an extremely complex scientific project with hundreds of single failure points. While it is something 99% of people will be paying no attention to, the truth of the matter is that NASA with the help of the US' Canadian and European allies(the later of which were responsible for the successful launch of the telescope) pulled off something extremely complex and difficult during a period of time when Western powers are supposedly "finished."
The article by James Timbie and Admiral James O. Ellis Jr. on a "porcupine" anti-invasion strategy for Taiwan was interesting and informative. It also showed that the more things change in the area of military art and science, the more they stay the same. What the authors are describing is essentially a form of defense in depth—which is nothing new. Among the many historical examples that can be cited there is the Battle of Kursk (July 1943), in which the Red Army used a layered, distributed defensive scheme to blunt and frustrate the German Army's last big offensive on the Eastern Front.
Given favorable terrain and sufficient resources, a defense in depth is the most effective defensive option. But it would be a mistake to conceive of it as a static defense, pure and simple; mobility remains important. Take, for example, an anti-armor defense based on small teams armed with antitank guided missiles. If such a team remains in one position, it will eventually be detected and eliminated. So a number of alternate positions must be identified for it, and the team must possess sufficient mobility to move among them.
Defense in depth also requires a sufficiently powerful and mobile reserve to conduct counterattacks against enemy penetrations. At Kursk, these counterattacks were conducted at every echelon of command, from the platoon to full divisions and corps, and eventually they transitioned to a major counteroffensive. In a Taiwan invasion scenario major counterattacks would probably be conducted by battalions and brigades, with the primary objective of maintaining the integrity of the overall defense.
Such a defense, operating in conjunction with air, missile and submarine attacks on the invader's seaborne communications with mainland China, would very likely prevent the People's Liberation Army from scoring a quick victory—which must obviously be its objective. For time would not be on the PLA's side. If the invasion were to bog down amid protracted fighting and increasing logistical problems, it would ultimately fail.
So the porcupine strategy—I would substitute the title "sponge-and-hammer strategy"—is probably Taiwan's best military option.
I want to suggest an article I was reading this weekend on the state of the newly launched James Webb Space Telescope. In short so far so good and more importantly many of the hardest tasks have now been finished for an extremely complex scientific project with hundreds of single failure points. While it is something 99% of people will be paying no attention to, the truth of the matter is that NASA with the help of the US' Canadian and European allies(the later of which were responsible for the successful launch of the telescope) pulled off something extremely complex and difficult during a period of time when Western powers are supposedly "finished."
https://arstechnica.com/science/2022/01/remarkably-nasa-has-completed-deployment-of-the-webb-space-telescope