Something else that didn't come up in the podcast is that Claire's suggestion of an America is Back, Vaccinate the World program seems to be less and less likely to happen. So what are the geopolitical implications? Will actually anyone outside the US care that the US has not to date been particularly helpful to the rest of the world? Or will they care big time and will you see a coming erosion of US power and prestige?
Which brings me to my second is the current lack of interest in a vaccinate the world program on the US' part I think shows just how shallow internationalism as among even parts of the American population that claim publicly to support America's global role.
Predictions of a digital revolution in the art of war remind me of nothing so much as the forecasts of the airpower prophets of the 1920s and 1930s. Supposedly armies and navies had been rendered obsolete by the airplane, which in its military form was capable of delivering a knockout blow to an enemy country's heartland, destroying its war industries, reducing its cities to rubble and shattering the morale of its civilian population.
But when the next war came, these prophecies proved to be wide of the mark. Though airpower did indeed add a new dimension to war, it did so in ways of which the airmen had disapproved, e.g. close air support of ground forces and naval aviation. These were precisely the roles that the RAF for example had shortchanged in the interwar years, choosing instead to focus on strategic bombing. And while it's true that the Allied strategic air offensive against Germany did great damage and killed around half a million civilians, it was not in itself decisive. Indeed, its greatest contribution to victory was not measured in tons of bombs dropped: The Luftwaffe suffered its greatest defeat in the skies over the homeland, ensuring Allied air superiority for D-Day and the rest of the war.
Strategic airpower seemed to realize its potential with the advent of nuclear weapons, but once the US lost its atomic monopoly it quickly became clear that weapons so obviously decisive could never be used. This may well prove to be the case with strategic digital warfare also: effective deterrence through the threat of massive digital retaliation.
Clausewitz reminds us that (1) war is a clash of living wills, not an exercise in mathematics or engineering, and (2) that war is a "true political instrument" whose character and course are determined by factors not organic to war itself. The possibilities of digital war should be analyzed with these principles in mind.
I've written about the history of strategic bombing here (ongoing project):
Enjoyed the podcast as usual. To add to Wolf Warrior diplomacy, our PM has recently been called a "boy" and a "running dog". In fact, until he grows a pair and stands up to China holding two Canadians hostage, that is probably pretty accurate. But not very diplomatic.
Check out Destined for War by Graham Allison. He reviews Thucydides history of the Peloponnesian War, where the dominant and established state, Sparta, was challenged by the upstart, impatient and respect demanding Athens. Sound familiar? He goes on to summarize 16 similar cases in history, 12 of which ended in war.
The Chinese economic, technical and military growth has been unprecedented, eclipsing even the US growth early in the 20th century.
The US was not unblemished in demanding its place in the sun. Interesting that for a country that eschews imperialism, Teddy Roosevelt chased the Europeans out of the Western Hemisphere, declaring that to be America's backyard, taking Cuba, Guam, Puerto Rico and the Philippines from Spain, routed Britain, France and Germany from their interests in Venezuela, cast a covetous eye on Canada (Manifest Destiny) and cost Canada the Alaskan panhandle because Britain was not willing to fight for it, and the US was.
Now China beckons. To quote Hillary Clinton, " I do not wish to live in a world dominated by China." We may not have a choice. American aircraft carriers can no longer stray too close to China as they are within range of missiles on the mainland. Hongkong, Taiwan and the South China Sea are soon to be lost.
Thucydides and Allison both point out the missteps, and the possible strategies to avoid war in the inevitable conflict. One of interest is that alliances can be fatal. Sparta and Athens went to war over a disagreement between two allies, not between themselves. They were driven by fear and honour. (See World War I)
That is not to say like minded democracies should not collude and prepare to face down the monster, but iron clad mutual protection may not be the right answer. Accommodation may be necessary. Realpolitik?
I look forward to hearing the CG comments on what to me is the ONLY issue of existential significance.
Are the Chinese statements about their ownership of Taiwan to be considered literally? Or is it more of a cynical Realpolitik? Or is it way too complicated to answer in brief?
I think the Chinese have been very clear about their intentions towards Taiwan. By realpolitik I mean Taiwan may have to be sacrificed to accommodate China’s growing dominant position (as distasteful as that is) while the West determines what it’s critical interests are and where to draw the line.
I guess there's something about the rhetoric regarding Taiwan as if they've never really lost it. It has a certain historical denialism that frightens me. It's one thing to say "They broke away and we'll take it back." It's quite another to say, "Well, you've always been ours, you just misunderstood."
I guess the Wilsonian principle of self determination is irrelevant here. The question is will the US go to war over it. It appears the Chinese might once they have their ducks lined up
Taiwan is a tricky issue as the world in general doesn't recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state. This makes it much different than even say Russia invading parts of Ukraine(which the world does recognize of a sovereign state), Saddam invading Kuwait, Ghaddafi invading Chad etc. Now there was a period of time back during the Charles De Gaulle era when De Gaulle was willing to open about the policy of recognizing both Taiwan and Mainland China as sovereign states but the Taiwan side rejected it wanting to hold on to it's claim of being the government of all of mainland China in exile.
Something I would say in response to Toomas is I think one problem Central and Eastern Europe have a vis a vis Macron is beyond opposition to Russia(and even then there are notable exceptions like Hungary) the CEE countries especially post Brexit are very divided among themselves on what type of European Union they want. Estonia for example seems to be much closer to the Franco-German idea of a United States of Europe whereas Poland and the Czech Republic are far more hostile to it and want more of an old pre-Brexit UK version of the EU as a free trade zone without currency and fiscal union for example. The issue for countries like Estonia I think is when these debates get going with people like Macron they will turn into France vs Poland arguments with Poland's hostility at least under its current ruling party to liberal democracy and European integration used to dismiss Poland's views on Russia with some of the smaller CEE countries like Estonia, Slovakia, etc that favor more European integration but don't rapprochement with Russia lost in the discussion.
Second I would argue what is even the current definition of Central and Eastern Europe. Are Finland and Sweden Eastern European countries? Should Hungary given its pro-Russian tilt as a political matter still be classified in this group? At the moment is Finland actually a closer bilateral ally of Estonia than Poland is?
And maybe the third point I will make is one reason Macron and France are so influential is they have for legacy reasons certain instruments of the 20th century like a permanent seat on the UNSC and nuclear weapons. This brings me to my final open question is to what extent does even a fairly Euro-enthusiast country like is Estonia is willing to actually go down the road to a "real" full fledged United States of Europe where Estonia like New Jersey would no longer be a UN Member State but where a USE would hold what were formerly's France's(which be like more like what California is to the USA) nuclear weapons and permanent security council seat. NOTE: the rest of the world including Russia would have a hard time stopping it just as Russia inherited the "superpower" status of the USSR in 1991. In fact, former French Ambassador to the UN and US Gerard Araud has been frequently said that the EU as a supranational organization under the UN Charter cannot be a UN Member State or security council member but if individual EU Member States were to cease to exist as UN Member's akin to US states, the EU/United States of Europe by succession would inherit the nuclear weapons state status under the non-proliferation treaty and a permanent seat on the UNSC on the day the French Republic shifted from being a sovereign state internationally to having the same status as Texas or Florida as a domestic subdivision(The reverse of what happening going from USSR to the Russian Federation). In fact on two occasions already multiple UN Member States have merged into a single resulting nation East and West Germany and North/South Yemen and basically, there is nothing the rest of the world say like the post Brexit UK or India, deeply embittered about its own lack of great power status can do to stop this. This leads me back to France's importance to the EU. Without France, even a United States of Europe would still be stuck in the same position as India in the halls of the great powers, whereas a United States of Europe as a successor entity to the French Republic automatically gets a seat at the great power table.
Something else that didn't come up in the podcast is that Claire's suggestion of an America is Back, Vaccinate the World program seems to be less and less likely to happen. So what are the geopolitical implications? Will actually anyone outside the US care that the US has not to date been particularly helpful to the rest of the world? Or will they care big time and will you see a coming erosion of US power and prestige?
Which brings me to my second is the current lack of interest in a vaccinate the world program on the US' part I think shows just how shallow internationalism as among even parts of the American population that claim publicly to support America's global role.
Predictions of a digital revolution in the art of war remind me of nothing so much as the forecasts of the airpower prophets of the 1920s and 1930s. Supposedly armies and navies had been rendered obsolete by the airplane, which in its military form was capable of delivering a knockout blow to an enemy country's heartland, destroying its war industries, reducing its cities to rubble and shattering the morale of its civilian population.
But when the next war came, these prophecies proved to be wide of the mark. Though airpower did indeed add a new dimension to war, it did so in ways of which the airmen had disapproved, e.g. close air support of ground forces and naval aviation. These were precisely the roles that the RAF for example had shortchanged in the interwar years, choosing instead to focus on strategic bombing. And while it's true that the Allied strategic air offensive against Germany did great damage and killed around half a million civilians, it was not in itself decisive. Indeed, its greatest contribution to victory was not measured in tons of bombs dropped: The Luftwaffe suffered its greatest defeat in the skies over the homeland, ensuring Allied air superiority for D-Day and the rest of the war.
Strategic airpower seemed to realize its potential with the advent of nuclear weapons, but once the US lost its atomic monopoly it quickly became clear that weapons so obviously decisive could never be used. This may well prove to be the case with strategic digital warfare also: effective deterrence through the threat of massive digital retaliation.
Clausewitz reminds us that (1) war is a clash of living wills, not an exercise in mathematics or engineering, and (2) that war is a "true political instrument" whose character and course are determined by factors not organic to war itself. The possibilities of digital war should be analyzed with these principles in mind.
I've written about the history of strategic bombing here (ongoing project):
https://tmg110.tripod.com/StratB_mp.htm
Enjoyed the podcast as usual. To add to Wolf Warrior diplomacy, our PM has recently been called a "boy" and a "running dog". In fact, until he grows a pair and stands up to China holding two Canadians hostage, that is probably pretty accurate. But not very diplomatic.
Check out Destined for War by Graham Allison. He reviews Thucydides history of the Peloponnesian War, where the dominant and established state, Sparta, was challenged by the upstart, impatient and respect demanding Athens. Sound familiar? He goes on to summarize 16 similar cases in history, 12 of which ended in war.
The Chinese economic, technical and military growth has been unprecedented, eclipsing even the US growth early in the 20th century.
The US was not unblemished in demanding its place in the sun. Interesting that for a country that eschews imperialism, Teddy Roosevelt chased the Europeans out of the Western Hemisphere, declaring that to be America's backyard, taking Cuba, Guam, Puerto Rico and the Philippines from Spain, routed Britain, France and Germany from their interests in Venezuela, cast a covetous eye on Canada (Manifest Destiny) and cost Canada the Alaskan panhandle because Britain was not willing to fight for it, and the US was.
Now China beckons. To quote Hillary Clinton, " I do not wish to live in a world dominated by China." We may not have a choice. American aircraft carriers can no longer stray too close to China as they are within range of missiles on the mainland. Hongkong, Taiwan and the South China Sea are soon to be lost.
Thucydides and Allison both point out the missteps, and the possible strategies to avoid war in the inevitable conflict. One of interest is that alliances can be fatal. Sparta and Athens went to war over a disagreement between two allies, not between themselves. They were driven by fear and honour. (See World War I)
That is not to say like minded democracies should not collude and prepare to face down the monster, but iron clad mutual protection may not be the right answer. Accommodation may be necessary. Realpolitik?
I look forward to hearing the CG comments on what to me is the ONLY issue of existential significance.
Monique will, in fact, be hosting our China Cosmopolicast *today.* Any specific questions for the participants?
Are the Chinese statements about their ownership of Taiwan to be considered literally? Or is it more of a cynical Realpolitik? Or is it way too complicated to answer in brief?
I think the Chinese have been very clear about their intentions towards Taiwan. By realpolitik I mean Taiwan may have to be sacrificed to accommodate China’s growing dominant position (as distasteful as that is) while the West determines what it’s critical interests are and where to draw the line.
I really hope you're wrong, for their sake.
I guess there's something about the rhetoric regarding Taiwan as if they've never really lost it. It has a certain historical denialism that frightens me. It's one thing to say "They broke away and we'll take it back." It's quite another to say, "Well, you've always been ours, you just misunderstood."
I guess the Wilsonian principle of self determination is irrelevant here. The question is will the US go to war over it. It appears the Chinese might once they have their ducks lined up
Taiwan is a tricky issue as the world in general doesn't recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state. This makes it much different than even say Russia invading parts of Ukraine(which the world does recognize of a sovereign state), Saddam invading Kuwait, Ghaddafi invading Chad etc. Now there was a period of time back during the Charles De Gaulle era when De Gaulle was willing to open about the policy of recognizing both Taiwan and Mainland China as sovereign states but the Taiwan side rejected it wanting to hold on to it's claim of being the government of all of mainland China in exile.
Great. How about, what strategies should we take, what are China’s weaknesses, where is India relative to China? Tks
All noted, thanks Eric
Something I would say in response to Toomas is I think one problem Central and Eastern Europe have a vis a vis Macron is beyond opposition to Russia(and even then there are notable exceptions like Hungary) the CEE countries especially post Brexit are very divided among themselves on what type of European Union they want. Estonia for example seems to be much closer to the Franco-German idea of a United States of Europe whereas Poland and the Czech Republic are far more hostile to it and want more of an old pre-Brexit UK version of the EU as a free trade zone without currency and fiscal union for example. The issue for countries like Estonia I think is when these debates get going with people like Macron they will turn into France vs Poland arguments with Poland's hostility at least under its current ruling party to liberal democracy and European integration used to dismiss Poland's views on Russia with some of the smaller CEE countries like Estonia, Slovakia, etc that favor more European integration but don't rapprochement with Russia lost in the discussion.
Second I would argue what is even the current definition of Central and Eastern Europe. Are Finland and Sweden Eastern European countries? Should Hungary given its pro-Russian tilt as a political matter still be classified in this group? At the moment is Finland actually a closer bilateral ally of Estonia than Poland is?
And maybe the third point I will make is one reason Macron and France are so influential is they have for legacy reasons certain instruments of the 20th century like a permanent seat on the UNSC and nuclear weapons. This brings me to my final open question is to what extent does even a fairly Euro-enthusiast country like is Estonia is willing to actually go down the road to a "real" full fledged United States of Europe where Estonia like New Jersey would no longer be a UN Member State but where a USE would hold what were formerly's France's(which be like more like what California is to the USA) nuclear weapons and permanent security council seat. NOTE: the rest of the world including Russia would have a hard time stopping it just as Russia inherited the "superpower" status of the USSR in 1991. In fact, former French Ambassador to the UN and US Gerard Araud has been frequently said that the EU as a supranational organization under the UN Charter cannot be a UN Member State or security council member but if individual EU Member States were to cease to exist as UN Member's akin to US states, the EU/United States of Europe by succession would inherit the nuclear weapons state status under the non-proliferation treaty and a permanent seat on the UNSC on the day the French Republic shifted from being a sovereign state internationally to having the same status as Texas or Florida as a domestic subdivision(The reverse of what happening going from USSR to the Russian Federation). In fact on two occasions already multiple UN Member States have merged into a single resulting nation East and West Germany and North/South Yemen and basically, there is nothing the rest of the world say like the post Brexit UK or India, deeply embittered about its own lack of great power status can do to stop this. This leads me back to France's importance to the EU. Without France, even a United States of Europe would still be stuck in the same position as India in the halls of the great powers, whereas a United States of Europe as a successor entity to the French Republic automatically gets a seat at the great power table.