Having operated American tanks, and been inside a great many others, Russian included, I agree. Never mind how to operate a tank, I doubt the Ukrainian soldiers would understand the tactical advantage you have with an M1 series tank over pretty much any Russian made tank. Now, send me (old cranky knees and all) and some of my buds over there? Well, nevermind...it's been too long.
All battles consist of multiple small unit actions in which the defense has a systemic advantage. That the Russians are no longer relying on their heavy-fisted armored forces is a bad sign for them. Electronic attacks, drones, bombardment, etc. cannot of themselves break down the kind of sponge defense that the Ukrainians are employing. An attacker can't prevail unless he attacks.
If the Russian air force has switched to night operations, this is a sign that Ukraine's air defenses have made the cost of daylight operations prohibitive. If the Russians can't employ their attack helicopters and close support aircraft by day, then they can't employ them at all.
Thomas, can you explain a few points in detail here for the benefit of people like me who don't know the first thing about modern warfare? "All battles consist of multiple small unit actions in which the defense has a systemic advantage"--I get that; a battle is a big thing made up of small things. But why is it a bad sign for the Russians that they're no longer using armored forces? (And by this you mean tanks and other armored vehicles, right?) Is it simply that without them, they can't move forward? This presumes, doesn't it, that Russia's aim is to move forward and hold territory. But it seems to me their aim at this point is to kill so many civilians, through bombing and artillery fire, as to (literally) empty cities by killing everyone in them, causing anyone who survives to flee, and crushing the morale of the military and political leadership--what's the point of fighting if everyone you're trying to defend is dead? Then, I assume, Moscow will move loyal ethnic Russians into the abandoned cities, where they can get to work exploiting Ukrainian gas fields, mineral deposits, and any other natural resources left. My guess is that this is what Russia is after, as horrifying as it is to contemplate: a Ukraine that really is part of Russia because there really aren't any Ukrainians left.
I can't figure out why switching to night operations is a sign that daylight operations are prohibitive, could you explain that? From a pilot's POV, what's the difference between flying in daylight and flying at night? Is it just that darkness makes it harder to see the planes? Presumably so, so why wouldn't any attacking Air Force prefer to fly at night, irrespective of cost? And why would it be true that If the Russians can't employ their attack helicopters and close support aircraft by day, they can't employ them at all? (This may be a stupid question, but I'm sure if I'm wondering, someone else will be, too.)
And finally a comment about the Russians’ inability to capitalize on their superior armored and mechanized ground forces.
There must by now be 200,000 or more Russian troops committed to the invasion of Ukraine, the great majority of whom are in armored and mechanized units. Major formations like the 1st Guards Tank Army are supposed to be the arm of decision in a big war; the rest exist to support their operations. If despite their numerical and firepower superiority they can’t beat down Ukrainian resistance, there’s something seriously wrong with the Russian Ground Forces. Armored and mechanized forces are expected to employ shock action and high mobility on the attack; they’re not configured for a battle of attrition. Apparently the Russian command has bowed to that reality and is holding them back.
Air forces—major ones, anyhow—are configured to perform a multiplicity of missions. In this case we can leave out strategic attack. In support of ground operations, the air force secures air superiority in order to facilitate tactical reconnaissance, close air support, interdiction and tactical transport.
Air superiority means dominating the airspace over the battlefield, attacking enemy airfields and suppressing enemy air defenses.
Tactical reconnaissance means locating enemy troop concentrations, artillery positions, assembly areas, supply dumps, etc.
Close air support means pinpoint attacks by fighter-bombers and attack helicopters in direct support of engaged friendly ground forces.
Interdiction means attacks on lines of supply, supply dumps, assembly areas, reserves on the move, etc.
Tactical transport means movement of troops by air in forward areas, i.e. airborne and airmobile (helicopter) operations.
This simplifies things a bit, but it gets the basic idea across. In the present case, if the Russian air force is restricted to night operations, it means that it has failed to accomplish its priority mission: air superiority. And this in turn degrades its ability to perform all the other missions I listed. The close air support and tactical transport missions can scarcely be carried out at all. Tactical reconnaissance is severely constrained. Interdiction can indeed be carried out by night, but its effect is diminished except perhaps against fixed installations.
To cite a couple of historical examples, both the Luftwaffe and the Royal Air Force tried daylight bombing early in World War II and switched to much less effective night bombing because losses in daylight operations were prohibitive. The RAF’s night area bombing policy made a virtue—if that is the word—of necessity.
This is very helpful, and it defined a lot of terms with which I was familiar, but which I didn't really understand. I hope our readers are looking at the comments, but I suspect some don't. Perhaps we should publish this in the "Letters to the editor," in a slightly edited form?
Okay, Claire, you asked several questions but I’ll begin with my overall strategic analysis. (Yes, I know, that sounds a bit bombastic coming from a former NCO. But after all, it’s the NCOs who really run the Army.)
The initial Russian strategic objective was to bring about a swift collapse of the Ukrainian government and armed forces by means of a coup de main: a sudden descent on the capital by airborne and airmobile troops staged out of captured airports. This operation failed, the Russians having overestimated their capabilities and underestimated the Ukrainian defense. So then the Russians tried to achieve the same strategic objective by means of an armored blitzkrieg. This totally failed in the north, and was only partially successful in the south and east. Here again the Russians overestimated and underestimated. Tactically, Russian troops proved incapable of conducting the kind of coordinated attacks necessary to overcome a defense in depth on urban and semi-urban terrain. In the attempt to do so they suffered heavy casualties.
So now, as you noted, the Russians seem to have fallen back on a strategy of terror: indiscriminate bombardment of urban areas, supplemented by more precise attacks against various fixed installations like airfields, supply dumps and training areas in the western part of Ukraine. We can only assume that the strategic objective remains unchanged: to bring about a collapse of the Ukrainian government and armed forces. The question is: Can a campaign of terror achieve that objective?
I’m dubious that it can. Ukraine is too large a country for such a campaign to have a nationwide effect. Putin’s forces can destroy cities in the east and south, but the west will remain relatively secure. I also wonder whether a terror campaign in an area with large populations of ethnic Russians will produce the desired effect. Bombarding Kharkiv, a city whose population is mostly ethnic Russian, seems ill calculated to endear them to the Motherland. Finally, a terror campaign targeting civilians does little or nothing to suppress Ukrainian military resistance. If the Ukrainian armed forces could be decisively defeated, all Putin’s problems would be solved. But it looks to me as though such a victory is out of reach for the Russians. And the alternative is speculative: There’s no guarantee that terror will work.
The historical record is mixed. In May 1940 the bombing of Rotterdam did convince the Dutch military command to capitulate. But it didn’t work against the British in 1940-41, nor during the V-weapons bombardment of 1944. Nor did it work against the Germans—and if you’ve ever perused the photographic record of the state of urban Germany by 1945, you’ll know just how terrible the Allied strategic bombing offensive was. (It killed 400,000 or more German civilians.) Even Japan would have held out despite strategic bombing had it not been for the atomic bomb.
What Putin seems to be doing is wrecking havoc on Ukraine in the hope that the Ukrainian government will throw up the sponge. And that, to my mind, is not a strategy at all. It’s a ploy with the aroma of flop sweat.
"I wouldn’t send the Ukrainians tanks."
Having operated American tanks, and been inside a great many others, Russian included, I agree. Never mind how to operate a tank, I doubt the Ukrainian soldiers would understand the tactical advantage you have with an M1 series tank over pretty much any Russian made tank. Now, send me (old cranky knees and all) and some of my buds over there? Well, nevermind...it's been too long.
A couple of comments:
All battles consist of multiple small unit actions in which the defense has a systemic advantage. That the Russians are no longer relying on their heavy-fisted armored forces is a bad sign for them. Electronic attacks, drones, bombardment, etc. cannot of themselves break down the kind of sponge defense that the Ukrainians are employing. An attacker can't prevail unless he attacks.
If the Russian air force has switched to night operations, this is a sign that Ukraine's air defenses have made the cost of daylight operations prohibitive. If the Russians can't employ their attack helicopters and close support aircraft by day, then they can't employ them at all.
Thomas, can you explain a few points in detail here for the benefit of people like me who don't know the first thing about modern warfare? "All battles consist of multiple small unit actions in which the defense has a systemic advantage"--I get that; a battle is a big thing made up of small things. But why is it a bad sign for the Russians that they're no longer using armored forces? (And by this you mean tanks and other armored vehicles, right?) Is it simply that without them, they can't move forward? This presumes, doesn't it, that Russia's aim is to move forward and hold territory. But it seems to me their aim at this point is to kill so many civilians, through bombing and artillery fire, as to (literally) empty cities by killing everyone in them, causing anyone who survives to flee, and crushing the morale of the military and political leadership--what's the point of fighting if everyone you're trying to defend is dead? Then, I assume, Moscow will move loyal ethnic Russians into the abandoned cities, where they can get to work exploiting Ukrainian gas fields, mineral deposits, and any other natural resources left. My guess is that this is what Russia is after, as horrifying as it is to contemplate: a Ukraine that really is part of Russia because there really aren't any Ukrainians left.
I can't figure out why switching to night operations is a sign that daylight operations are prohibitive, could you explain that? From a pilot's POV, what's the difference between flying in daylight and flying at night? Is it just that darkness makes it harder to see the planes? Presumably so, so why wouldn't any attacking Air Force prefer to fly at night, irrespective of cost? And why would it be true that If the Russians can't employ their attack helicopters and close support aircraft by day, they can't employ them at all? (This may be a stupid question, but I'm sure if I'm wondering, someone else will be, too.)
Thanks!
And finally a comment about the Russians’ inability to capitalize on their superior armored and mechanized ground forces.
There must by now be 200,000 or more Russian troops committed to the invasion of Ukraine, the great majority of whom are in armored and mechanized units. Major formations like the 1st Guards Tank Army are supposed to be the arm of decision in a big war; the rest exist to support their operations. If despite their numerical and firepower superiority they can’t beat down Ukrainian resistance, there’s something seriously wrong with the Russian Ground Forces. Armored and mechanized forces are expected to employ shock action and high mobility on the attack; they’re not configured for a battle of attrition. Apparently the Russian command has bowed to that reality and is holding them back.
Now let me tackle your question about airpower.
Air forces—major ones, anyhow—are configured to perform a multiplicity of missions. In this case we can leave out strategic attack. In support of ground operations, the air force secures air superiority in order to facilitate tactical reconnaissance, close air support, interdiction and tactical transport.
Air superiority means dominating the airspace over the battlefield, attacking enemy airfields and suppressing enemy air defenses.
Tactical reconnaissance means locating enemy troop concentrations, artillery positions, assembly areas, supply dumps, etc.
Close air support means pinpoint attacks by fighter-bombers and attack helicopters in direct support of engaged friendly ground forces.
Interdiction means attacks on lines of supply, supply dumps, assembly areas, reserves on the move, etc.
Tactical transport means movement of troops by air in forward areas, i.e. airborne and airmobile (helicopter) operations.
This simplifies things a bit, but it gets the basic idea across. In the present case, if the Russian air force is restricted to night operations, it means that it has failed to accomplish its priority mission: air superiority. And this in turn degrades its ability to perform all the other missions I listed. The close air support and tactical transport missions can scarcely be carried out at all. Tactical reconnaissance is severely constrained. Interdiction can indeed be carried out by night, but its effect is diminished except perhaps against fixed installations.
To cite a couple of historical examples, both the Luftwaffe and the Royal Air Force tried daylight bombing early in World War II and switched to much less effective night bombing because losses in daylight operations were prohibitive. The RAF’s night area bombing policy made a virtue—if that is the word—of necessity.
This is very helpful, and it defined a lot of terms with which I was familiar, but which I didn't really understand. I hope our readers are looking at the comments, but I suspect some don't. Perhaps we should publish this in the "Letters to the editor," in a slightly edited form?
If you think that it would be of interest to other readers, absolutely.
Okay, Claire, you asked several questions but I’ll begin with my overall strategic analysis. (Yes, I know, that sounds a bit bombastic coming from a former NCO. But after all, it’s the NCOs who really run the Army.)
The initial Russian strategic objective was to bring about a swift collapse of the Ukrainian government and armed forces by means of a coup de main: a sudden descent on the capital by airborne and airmobile troops staged out of captured airports. This operation failed, the Russians having overestimated their capabilities and underestimated the Ukrainian defense. So then the Russians tried to achieve the same strategic objective by means of an armored blitzkrieg. This totally failed in the north, and was only partially successful in the south and east. Here again the Russians overestimated and underestimated. Tactically, Russian troops proved incapable of conducting the kind of coordinated attacks necessary to overcome a defense in depth on urban and semi-urban terrain. In the attempt to do so they suffered heavy casualties.
So now, as you noted, the Russians seem to have fallen back on a strategy of terror: indiscriminate bombardment of urban areas, supplemented by more precise attacks against various fixed installations like airfields, supply dumps and training areas in the western part of Ukraine. We can only assume that the strategic objective remains unchanged: to bring about a collapse of the Ukrainian government and armed forces. The question is: Can a campaign of terror achieve that objective?
I’m dubious that it can. Ukraine is too large a country for such a campaign to have a nationwide effect. Putin’s forces can destroy cities in the east and south, but the west will remain relatively secure. I also wonder whether a terror campaign in an area with large populations of ethnic Russians will produce the desired effect. Bombarding Kharkiv, a city whose population is mostly ethnic Russian, seems ill calculated to endear them to the Motherland. Finally, a terror campaign targeting civilians does little or nothing to suppress Ukrainian military resistance. If the Ukrainian armed forces could be decisively defeated, all Putin’s problems would be solved. But it looks to me as though such a victory is out of reach for the Russians. And the alternative is speculative: There’s no guarantee that terror will work.
The historical record is mixed. In May 1940 the bombing of Rotterdam did convince the Dutch military command to capitulate. But it didn’t work against the British in 1940-41, nor during the V-weapons bombardment of 1944. Nor did it work against the Germans—and if you’ve ever perused the photographic record of the state of urban Germany by 1945, you’ll know just how terrible the Allied strategic bombing offensive was. (It killed 400,000 or more German civilians.) Even Japan would have held out despite strategic bombing had it not been for the atomic bomb.
What Putin seems to be doing is wrecking havoc on Ukraine in the hope that the Ukrainian government will throw up the sponge. And that, to my mind, is not a strategy at all. It’s a ploy with the aroma of flop sweat.