The demographic impact of Russian mobilization

If you want to follow what's happening in Ukraine, you need Monique Camarra's EuroFile.

I’ve realized recently how much I rely on Monique Camarra’s EuroFile—which she puts out faithfully every day—to keep current on what’s happening in Ukraine. She’s following the issue more closely than I have time to do, and she catches more than I catch. For example, here’s an item from her newsletter today that I hadn’t noticed. It’s a stunning assessment.

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The Russian economists Maxim Mironov and Oleg Itskhoki have published an important thread estimating the likely demographic impacts of mobilization on Russia. A translation follows.

1. Over the next six months, an attempt will be made to mobilize between 700,000 and 1 million people.

2. We estimate the target group for the first call-up to be 2-3 million people. In total, the probability of being drafted among members of this group exceeds 25 percent.

3. We estimate the expected casualties during the first 6 months among the conscripts at 60-70 percent. Of these, we estimate 15-20 percent killed, 45-50 percent wounded.

4. The demographic damage from the war in Ukraine to the Russian population will be many times greater than the damage from the Covid pandemic.

5. We expect two waves of a spike in crime. The first wave will be among those returning from the war. The second wave will be among orphans who will grow up without fathers.

6. Sabotage of conscription and all methods of evading military service is an optimal strategy at the individual level and makes it impossible to conscript significantly more young men.

7. But this strategy does not significantly alter the number of conscripts in the first months of the campaign and thus avoid the loss of human life associated with it.