An India-Pakistan Conflict Reading List

May 09, 2025

Vivek sent me the following. It would be terrific if everyone could have a look at these articles and the video before joining us on Sunday for this discussion.

The rising tension between India and Pakistan, briefly explained. How a terrorist attack put the neighbors on the armed conflict. (I was pleased that Vivek chose this because I also thought it was good.)

Operation Sindoor: Why didn’t China take much of a pro-Pakistan stand this time?

China’s calculated neutrality on Pahalgam. China prefers the status quo—continuing tensions between India and Pakistan short of war, which would gradually drain both countries:

… Chinese support for Pakistan is increasingly part of a transactional approach. This should not be surprising. American support to Pakistan has dwindled following the Afghanistan drawdown. While the economic relationship has grown with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), China’s exposure is also not as great as it is often portrayed—most figures for Chinese investments in Pakistan as part of the corridor are wildly exaggerated.
… China might not want a full-blown India-Pakistan conflict for several reasons, including the possible return of the US to the region in some form or fashion and this time, most likely on the Indian side. This would mean that China would have to take sides with the Pakistanis. Apart from the lack of any real political or economic gain from such backing, the Chinese probably also do not want to complicate ties with either the US or India at this moment.
Despite its retaliatory measures against the US in the trade war and the aggressive rhetoric, Beijing is also concerned about longer-term implications for its economy and has kept the door open for negotiations with the Americans. The current Chinese thaw with the Indians has at least partly to do with concerns with the Donald Trump administration in the US and is too recent for the Chinese to want to complicate with anything more than the sort of signals outlined above. No wonder then that Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi's phone call with his Pakistani counterpart ended by saying that “conflict does not serve the fundamental interests of either India or Pakistan.”

JD Vance: It’s “fundamentally none of our business.”

“What we can do is try to encourage these folks to de-escalate a little bit, but we’re not going to get involved in the middle of war that’s fundamentally none of our business and has nothing to do with America’s ability to control it. You know, America can’t tell the Indians to lay down their arms. We can’t tell the Pakistanis to lay down their arms. And so, we’re going to continue to pursue this thing through diplomatic channels,” Vance [said]. “Our hope and our expectation is that this is not going to spiral into a broader regional war or, God forbid, a nuclear conflict. …. “Right now, we don’t think that’s going to happen.” The remarks by Vance came as Pakistan made a failed attempt to attack military establishment in Jammu, Pathankot and several other cities.
India’s air defense system intercepted and neutralized at least eight missiles launched by Islamabad. Earlier, US President Donald Trump said he wants India and Pakistan to “stop” what he described as “tit for tat” actions, saying if he can do anything to “help,” he will be there. “Oh it's so terrible. My position is I get along with both. I know both very well and I want to see them work it out. I want to see them stop and hopefully they can stop now. They have gone tit for tat, so hopefully they can stop now. I know both, we get along with both the countries very well. Good relationships with both and I want to see it stop. And If I can do anything to help, I will be there,” Trump said in response to a question on the “war” between India and Pakistan. Trump's remarks came after the Indian military carried out strikes against terror targets in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and Pakistan’s Punjab province on Wednesday.
Pakistan army carried out artillery and mortar shelling targeting forward villages along the Line Of Control in Jammu and Kashmir.

Trump 2.0 and Pakistan-US Relations. Although Pakistan may not be a priority for US interests as it was earlier, the US simply cannot ignore a nuclear-armed Muslim country with 240 million people:

On India-Pakistan Conflict, The United States needs to tread carefully. India’s aerial attacks on Pakistan mark a sharp escalation in tensions between the two nuclear-armed nations following an attack in Kashmir that killed twenty-six tourists and posing a dilemma for US policymakers:

… The strikes, when they came, were much wider than in 2019 —they were conducted against nine sites in Pakistan that the Indian government claimed were associated with terrorist camps and infrastructure. Pakistan reported more than twenty deaths from the Indian strikes, while Indian officials reported at least twelve killed by Pakistani shelling.
Perhaps most importantly, the reprisal attacks showed the Indian government will not hesitate to respond to terrorist attacks on its soil using conventional forces. That is, the possible threat of the use of low-yield nuclear weapons by Pakistan is not going to be a deterrent.
…. If the United States government were to be seen as either unsupportive of India or interfering in any way in Kashmir, it would be a serious setback to the US-India partnership. But the risk of escalation between two nuclear-armed neighbors is also real. The United States’ relationship with Pakistan is at an all-time low, giving it limited leverage over the country. Meanwhile, it remains to be seen how China will respond, and how far it will support Pakistan publicly—what it will do privately is anyone’s guess, especially given that China itself is worried about the threat of Islamist groups. The Trump administration now needs to consider incentives it can offer both countries if the conflict escalates further. A war in South Asia, whether low or high level, would be highly detrimental to US interests.

I’m going to add a few more articles not because I endorse them, but because I’d like to know what Vivek and Raja think.

The French are dismayed by reports of the loss of one of their Rafales. Le Monde writes:

Military operation in Pakistan reveals weaknesses of India’s air force. New Delhi has begun to acknowledge the loss of several fighter jets during Operation Sindoor. Military experts suggest that at least one Rafale may be among the destroyed aircraft. This would mark the first loss in combat for the French aircraft:

… The show of force intended by New Delhi is widely viewed by many military experts as a significant underperformance. Despite the bombing of nearly a dozen sites in Pakistan, with significant damage observed, India was forced to acknowledge the loss of at least three fighter jets during this operation. These major losses reveal the weaknesses of the Indian Air Force.
… Based on open-source footage analysis, the hypothesis of at least one Rafale being destroyed is deemed credible by Paris. For the aircraft manufactured by the French company Dassault, this would be a first in combat.
This sequence also fits into a complicated context for the Indian military, which has struggled for many years to boost its air combat capabilities. This is despite significant investments to modernize its fleet, notably the purchase in 2016 of 36 Rafales for around €8 billion.
… Throughout May 7, despite triumphalist tones about the success of “Operation Sindoor,” Indian authorities worked to deny the destruction of combat aircraft and downplay civilian losses, defending actions as “measured, non-escalatory, proportionate, and responsible.” Several media outlets in the country were compelled to remove information about aircraft crashes from their websites under pressure from the Narendra Modi government.
“If aircraft have been lost, it’s certainly a setback. If Rafales have been lost, it’s an even bigger setback and naturally tarnishes the image of the Indian operation. Losing aircraft is never good, but losing aircraft while trying to conduct a clearly planned, rehearsed and prepared operation is inevitably painful and embarrassing,” said Sushant Singh, a former Indian Army officer and strategic analyst.
… “If Pakistan attempts to attack India or retaliate with an operation causing significant Indian casualties or injuring Indian soldiers, New Delhi might then be forced to respond even more forcefully, leading to a much graver crisis,” argued Singh. The confrontation between the two nuclear powers is already considered the most serious since 1971. …

Twelve arguments to make sense of Operation Sindoor:

The arguments:

Operation Sindoor underscores the idea that the government of India is determined to respond to terrorism, regardless of the consequences of such a response. … Indian policymakers seek to establish a “military response to terrorist attacks” as a doctrinal innovation.
Low-level military actions (like 2016 and 2019) may not be the preferred response any longer.

Operation Sindoor seeks to show that India no longer accepts there is a fundamental distinction between subconventional (terrorism) and conventional (military) aggression. Pakistan has traditionally exploited this distinction to paint a doomsday escalatory scenario to prevent Indian military response to terror attacks. If India doesn’t accept that distinction any longer, Pakistan’s ability to exploit that space to carry out/allow/do nothing about terror attacks against India no longer exists.

… Pakistan can no longer depend on nuclear threats to deter Indian conventional attacks in response to subconventional aggression. In that sense, India has Pakistan where it wants it: In the strictly conventional space where it enjoys superiority. Pakistan is not a military pushover, for sure, but India certainly enjoys far more conventional firepower and potential military suppliers. A conventional exchange/limited war with India without nuclear threats in play is not something Pakistan can win.

(Claire—are points 1-4 not the same?)

Operation Sindoor severely diminishes Pakistan’s ability to hide behind the lack of conclusive evidence to show the Pakistani state’s complicity in terror attacks against India. … Waiting for conclusive evidence to punish Pakistan is not helpful in the Indian thinking given that such evidence will always be disputed, and by the time such evidence emerges the situation would have changed dramatically.

Delhi no longer feels the need to furnish reams of evidence to the international community about who is responsible for the attacks.

(Claire—are points 5 and 6 not the same?)

[B]y carrying out a terrorist attack against India, it is actually Pakistan … initiating a conventional military conflict. The onus is on Pakistan to ensure there is no terrorist attack if it seeks to prevent a military conflict.
Operation Sindoor is an attempt to reinstate deterrence against terrorism as achieved by the Balakot strikes.
Those publicly advising restraint and dialogue with Pakistan will get no traction in Delhi’s corridors of power.
Delhi is likely to expect its strategic partners to align with its policy on terrorism, broadly to put pressure on Pakistan, and react strongly to those seeking to repudiate Indian retaliation or morally shame India for its military response to terrorism. Expect Delhi to use its leverage as a major economy, growing market, participant in global forums and governance, and its vast diaspora and its strategic partnerships to achieve this.
Operation Sindoor far exceeds the scope, intensity, outcome and escalatory potentially of any of the previous operations.
Operation Sindoor has pretty much ended the old India-Pakistan relationship. There is little chance of India-Pakistan relations going back to the old format of comprehensive/composite dialogues, discussions on Kashmir, people to people cooperation etc. Even the start of conversations to establish normal relations with Pakistan will take considerable time and effort. Clearly, no one is thinking of dialogue right now.

India and Pakistan edge closer to war. (Claire—is this not war already?) Both nuclear powers blame each other for the deteriorating situation

Two days after India struck terrorist targets in Pakistan—specifically the groups Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Toiba and Hizbul Mujahideen—in retaliation for a deadly civilian attack in Kashmir, the two nuclear powers have spiraled into a conflict that brings them ever closer to war.
Shortly after nightfall on Thursday, May 8, the Pakistani army launched its offensive with a barrage of missiles on Indian Kashmir, targeting military posts in Jammu, Pathankot, Udhampur and Jalandhar, all along the international border. India imposed a complete blackout in 15 cities in Kashmir, as well as in the border state of Gujarat, Punjab and Rajasthan. Sirens wailed everywhere, and public service workers’ leave was canceled, especially for those in the police and health sectors. All schools in Kashmir were closed.
Indian villages—Uri, Poonch, Kupwara—along the Line of Control, the de facto border in Kashmir, were evacuated. The capital, Srinagar, was plunged into darkness, its airport placed on high alert, but it was the city of Jammu that was particularly targeted. Pakistani forces launched a wave of drones and missiles on the second-largest city of Kashmir, also a Hindu enclave in this majority Muslim region. Most of the attacks were reportedly thwarted by Indian defenses.
The escalation was inevitable. On Thursday, India, which had presented Operation “Sindoor” as “focused, measured and non-escalatory in nature,” directed only against nine terrorist targets while sparing civilian, economic and military sites, deployed Israeli-made harop drones to bomb a military site in Lahore, the capital of Pakistan's Punjab and a province of the military. The Indian army claimed to have “neutralized” the air defense deployed there. Other cities in Pakistan, including Karachi, were also targeted in an attempt to destroy radars.
The Indian Ministry of Defense justified this risk-taking by stating that the previous night, from May 7 to 8, Pakistan attacked several cities (Awantipura, Srinagar, Jammu, Pathankot, Amritsar, Chandigarh) in Kashmir, as well as in Punjab and Gujarat. An accusation denied by Islamabad: “The Government of Pakistan categorically rejects the baseless and irresponsible allegations propagated by the Indian media, accusing Pakistan of launching attacks on Pathankot, Jaisalmer, and Srinagar. These claims are entirely unfounded, politically motivated, and part of a reckless propaganda campaign aimed at maligning Pakistan.”
Following the Indian drone attacks, the Pakistani army spokesperson, Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, vowed that New Delhi “will continue to pay dearly for this naked aggression” and claimed that 25 Indian drones had been shot down.
On Thursday, shortly after nightfall at 8 pm, Pakistan launched an offensive whose outcome is still difficult to assess. The information war is raging between the two capitals, each blaming the other for the deterioration of the situation, denying setbacks and claiming unverifiable achievements relayed by frenzied media they attempt to control. New Delhi ordered X to block more than 8,000 accounts, including those of international media; some Pakistani outlets are no longer accessible from India.
The government of Narendra Modi still won’t acknowledge the information published by the international press that several of its aircraft were shot down by Pakistan during Operation “Sindoor,” including at least one Rafale. Two American officials confirmed to the Reuters news agency that a Pakistani aircraft of Chinese manufacture had destroyed at least two Indian military aircraft on Wednesday. Islamabad had equipped itself with Chinese J-10C fighters shortly after New Delhi’s purchase of Rafales in 2016. If verified, it would be the first time that this Chinese combat aircraft achieved victory in an aerial battle and also the first time a Rafale had been shot down.
The discreet shadow of China, India’s other major rival in the Himalayas, which contests several parts of its territory and is a traditional ally of Pakistan, looms over the conflict. … The era when international mediation, particularly American, could play a decisive role in halting confrontation between the two neighbors seems to be gone. … The subcontinent has entered a zone of peril.

Operation Sindoor and Beyond: India’s Response and Pakistani Calculus

…. Deterrence is difficult even in the best times, as it hinges on the adversary’s cost-benefit calculations. Despite asymmetries in power, a determined opponent may still opt for using force. Whether through proxy means or conventional war, with or without nuclear weapons, Pakistan’s revisionist goals, ideological mindset, high-risk tolerance, and the dominant role of its military make it especially hard to deter. Pakistan is not a normal state—it does not perceive the consequences of using force in the manner that other states do.
… While the impulse to punish Pakistan is understandable, New Delhi must also recognize that such failures have become less frequent than in the past. Pakistan-backed terrorism is now largely limited to Kashmir, where major attacks are sporadic. The region is more securely under Indian control than ever, and the widespread condemnation of the Pahalgam killings marks a significant inflection point in local sentiment. … American leadership and the India-US partnership have been crucial in isolating and pressuring Pakistan—something harder to achieve now.
… Prime Minister Modi has reshaped India’s approach to combating Pakistani-sponsored terrorism in two key ways. First, instead of merely accepting Pakistan’s risk-driven strategies, India now actively manipulates risk through escalation. However, each failure of deterrence forces India higher up the escalation ladder. Second, Modi has created significant audience costs for India’s political class, making inaction against Pakistani provocations politically costly. In democracies, such costs signal resolve but also create traps of commitment, pushing leaders toward suboptimal decisions. India’s challenge is to foment deterrence, avoid unnecessary escalation, and impose costs on Pakistan, all within a domestic and global political landscape significantly different from that of 2019, when the Balakot airstrikes were ordered. Modi can withstand the audience costs that many believe could push him into a commitment trap. His popularity has proven remarkably resilient, and on national security, his perceived credentials far exceed those of his political opponents, further strengthening his ability to navigate the crisis.
While escalation carries its momentum, the fear of nuclear exchange remains overstated. While Pakistan leverages nuclear rhetoric to test India’s resolve and draw international attention, its nuclear redlines are implausibly low to be credible. For example, it has threatened full-spectrum retaliation, including deploying nuclear weapons, for any restriction on water flow under the Indus Water Treaty—an extreme stance that only serves to undermine its credibility.
In the current crisis, while Pakistan’s civilian and military leadership have both repeatedly raised the specter of a nuclear flashpoint, their actual behavior suggests otherwise. When the Indian fighter pilot was captured in 2019, Modi’s government threatened missile strikes if harm came to him. The warning was relayed by the chief of the Research and Analysis Wing, India’s external spy agency chief, to his counterpart in Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence on February 27, 2019. This was later confirmed by India’s National Security Advisor Ajit Doval to then US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and National Security Advisor John Bolton. India deployed Brahmos missiles in Rajasthan, and Pakistan’s counter-threat was conventional—not nuclear. If India planned to launch nine missiles, Pakistan prepared for thirteen. Islamabad’s response was not nuclear brinkmanship but a calculated quid pro quo plus.
This time, escalation could unfold differently due to two key factors—the first being Pakistan’s internal turmoil. General Asim Munir faces multiple challenges, and the crisis has triggered a rally-around-the-Army effect. Pakistan witnessed one of its worst civil-military conflicts in April 2022 when then Prime Minister Imran Khan was ousted via a no-confidence vote by a coalition led by Shehbaz Sharif—an effort orchestrated by the Army establishment. Not since the loss of Bangladesh during the 1971 war has the military faced such a crisis of legitimacy. Munir’s appointment as Chief of Army Staff was fiercely opposed by Khan, who sought to install a loyalist, deepening divisions within the Army. These tensions culminated in the widespread rigging of the 2024 elections by the military in favor of the Sharif coalition. In this volatile landscape, any Indian action would likely be seized upon by Munir and the Pakistani establishment to suppress dissent within both the Army and broader society, further consolidating their grip on power.
Second, the current geopolitical landscape is shaped by American disengagement and China’s growing influence. US support has played a crucial role in India’s Pakistan policy in the last two decades. Since the Kargil war, successive American administrations have backed New Delhi’s stance on terrorism in Kashmir. While the present US leadership acknowledges India’s grievances and its right to retaliate, its ability to pressure Islamabad is weakened by internal struggles and a limited attention span. Unlike in 2019, American rhetoric now seems both muted and disengaged. Conversely, China has emerged as a more assertive ally for Pakistan. Beijing has pledged to protect Pakistan’s sovereignty and supported Islamabad’s demand for a “neutral investigation” into the terrorist attack. Chinese patronage is reinforced by deepening Sino-Pak military ties and significant Chinese investments in Pakistan, including in PoK.
At the same time, India remains heavily occupied along its volatile northern border. A critical lesson for Indian leadership is that despite recent diplomatic overtures, China will not alter its long-standing policy of backing Pakistan and constraining India in the region. As China’s influence expands, New Delhi will have to leverage American power and purpose more effectively.

Modi, Kashmir, and Pakistan (I’m including these so that we have Pakistani perspectives, too—C.) India and Pakistan are being driven, inexorably, towards a confrontation that neither side wants but neither side can avert:

…. As Pakistan sank once more into its pre-9/11 state of isolation coupled with a depleted economy, the Congress party hurtled towards its most stunning electoral defeat ever in 2014. That was Modi’s year, when he also brought this model of violent development as his party’s vision for achieving a final resolution of New Delhi’s long-running Kashmir problem. Two ideas were central to this vision, and both have a pedigree in India’s policy conversation going back at least to the early 2000s. One was to revoke Kashmir’s special status granted under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. The second was to cast off the constraints of the Indus Waters Treaty. With both these done, the government would be in a better position to use public funds to initiate large-scale infrastructure projects through which to select winners and losers within Kashmir. The idea was to reward those who would play ball with the government, and crush those who wouldn’t.
These are the broad developments that imparted such inexorable momentum to the episodic return of stand-offs between India and Pakistan. Modi’s India wants to make Kashmir its own, regardless of the wishes of Kashmir’s inhabitants. Pakistan is determined to thwart this ambition, regardless of the cost it has to pay along the way. Neither side can win in this situation. Yet none can afford to lose either.

Time for restraint:

Airports have been shut, exams postponed and markets have been on edge. On Thursday, the military said that 25 Israeli-made Indian drones were shot down over different parts of Pakistan. In some cases, India’s drone attacks led to damage and injuries. While India had struck sites in AJK and Punjab in its initial aggression on May 7, yesterday’s drone targets included Sindh as New Delhi climbed up the escalatory ladder. Indian media outlets claimed that Pakistan attacked targets in held Jammu and Kashmir, but the government has denied this. The fact is that India initiated hostilities against Pakistan on the basis of unproven allegations in the Pahalgam killings, and launched its so-called “Operation Sindoor.” Pakistan retaliated by downing five of its jets. It is now time for all to step back from the brink.
India’s defense minister asserted that his country wanted to resolve “problems through dialogue”, while its military stressed its “commitment to non-escalation.” But the fact remains, that India is persisting with its provocative attacks, jeopardizing civilian lives on this side of the border. Therefore, its “commitment” to dialogue and non-escalation remains highly questionable.
… Sadly, while foreign friends have counseled restraint, there has been a marked indifference on the part of the international community to actively help defuse the crisis. This indifference is perplexing in a nuclear neighborhood, as an escalation in hostilities will not remain a bilateral matter, but affect all of South Asia as well as the Middle East.
… Jingoism is evident in both countries, but elements in India’s media, cultural and political sphere have been egging on their country in the confrontation. Perhaps they think of war in the context of Bollywood action films. The actual reality of conflict is much darker. Even a conventional war would cost countless lives and increase misery on both sides. What a nuclear showdown has in store is too horrific to contemplate. Therefore, sense must prevail, and the march to war should be halted.