Here’s the video of our Symposium with Fatima abo-Alasrar of The Ideology Machine, which I highly recommend.
Our conversation focused on the Houthis, Iran, the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb, along with the broader escalation trap confronting the United States, Israel, and the Gulf states. Fatima argued that Yemen is not a sideshow but a warning: What happened with the Houthis offers a dismaying preview of what may very well happen with Iran.
She began by explaining why she wasn’t surprised that the Houthis had waited until recently to enter the conflict. Their restraint, she said, had been dictated by the temporary limits on their capacity. The Houthis are not hesitant by nature; they ‘re reckless and opportunistic, and in recent years they’ve functioned, in part, as a testing ground for Iran’s missiles and its long-range strike capabilities. Their ability to act depends to a large degree on the supply lines and smuggling routes that deliver missile components and technical expertise. She was alarmed by reports that IRGC personnel and matériel are still reaching Yemen via small vessels from the Horn of Africa: This suggest that the Houthis’ military capabilities might be recovering.
The Houthis, she stressed, can’t be decapitated through conventional force. Israel or the United States might kill senior figures and destroy facilities, but the movement regenerates, “like a lizard.” Its ministers and officeholders are, in many cases, placeholders within a deeper ideological and coercive system. The Houthis are thus like an Iranian regime in miniature: remove one layer and another appears.
Their rule, she said, has transformed Yemen in a remarkably short period, brutalizing the population and hardening a structure of control that’s extremely difficult to uproot.
She also stressed that the Houthis’ threat is broad. They sit astride critical maritime chokepoints; they’ve shown the ability to hamper regional energy flows, shipping, insurance costs, and political calculations in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia’s earlier experience taught Riyadh, she said, that when a threat can’t be contained, it can instead be bought off; this explains why the Houthis haven’t been attacking Saudi Arabia recently: There are probably deals taking place in the background, whether tacit or explicit. But this is a precarious equilibrium, and the broader war has changed the game: The Gulf states are no longer spectators; they’ve become part of the conflict.
She brought up an important point about casualty figures and information operations. She was skeptical about the way the estimated death toll from the Saudi war in Yemen abruptly surged—a figure that for years had been in the tens of thousands suddenly leapt to 250,000 or more. She didn’t deny the immense suffering produced by the war—including deaths from famine, infrastructure collapse, and long-term deprivation. But she thought that these numbers were often methodologically suspect and politically convenient, used by advocates who weren’t transparent about what, exactly, was being counted. This led to a broader point about the way Western policymakers and publics are influenced by information operations and highly selective framings of conflicts in the region.
We next discussed ideology, something of special interest to her (and to me, for that matter) as suggested by the name of her newsletter, “The Ideology Machine.” She sees ideology are real and important—but also manipulated by elites.
The Houthi movement began as the “Believing Youth,” a revivalist effort to recover Yemen’s Zaydi heritage in the face of Saudi-backed Sunni influence. But its founder, Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, returned from Iran radicalized. From that point, the movement became increasingly militarized, anti-American, and revolutionary.
The Houthis weren’t passive proxies, she noted. They actively wanted to become Iran’s proxy, and pitched themselves for that role. Iran’s investment in them was limited, at first, but it proved strategically brilliant, yielding unusually high returns.
Ideology, she argued, works because it gives followers a sense of higher purpose, grievance, lineage, and sacred destiny. The Houthis exploit claims of descent from the Prophet; they draw on a tradition in which legitimate rule belongs to that lineage. Yet for the leadership, ideology is often also instrumental: a means of mobilizing followers, enforcing conformity, and laundering power. The same dynamic, she suggested, applies to the IRGC. (This led us to wonder if perhaps ideological movements can make deals, if only in face-saving forms that preserve their prestige and control.)
Our discussion returned, repeatedly, to the ways authoritarian actors exploit the openness of democratic societies. Fatima said that the Houthis, the IRGC, and aligned powers carefully monitor Western media, public opinion, polling, and headlines for every sign of exploitable division, criticism, or military difficulty. Western democracy and freedom of speech readily become tools to be turned against the West. The Houthis repurpose Western useful idiots—fringe figures—who visit Houthi-controlled Yemen as proof that the West endorses the movement. This conflict isn’t just kinetic: It’s epistemic and psychological. (This theme has been coming up repeatedly in our recent conversations.)
The lesson from Yemen, Fatima’s suggested, is the danger of tactical success without strategic victory. The United States may have hit the right targets in Yemen; it is little known, she said, that the Houthis in fact quietly capitulated during the 2025 campaign. But because the follow-up was weak, inconsistent, and politically shallow, the result wasn’t durable. The Houthis retrenched, regrew, and redirected their violence inward, kidnapping aid workers and repressing Yemenis even more. This is precisely the nightmare she fears in Iran—a wounded but surviving regime that turns its anger on its own population and survives to fight another day.
We then broadened the discussion to Iran and the Strait of Hormuz. We all sensed that the United States and its allies are trapped. We can’t tolerate Iran continuing to close or toll the Strait: That gives Tehran control over global energy markets, food systems, supply chains, and the wider world economy. Yet none of us could think of an effective military solution. Seizing Iranian oil tankers risks escalation with China. The idea of taking Kharg Island or coastal positions sounded to us like Gallipoli 2.0. A full-scale military effort to retake and hold the Strait would require a massive commitment of ground forces, for which there is absolutely no political appetite. Iran seems better positioned for a war of attrition than the Trump administration grasps.
This led to the concept we’d convened to discuss: the escalation trap. Every move to gain leverage risks widening the war, drawing in new actors, and worsening the ultimate terms of the settlement. The United States has enormous military power but no diplomatic credibility; it has squandered its alliances and the world’s trust. Iran has suffered enormous damage, but it retains the capacity to drag out the crisis and exploit the world’s dependence on maritime energy flows and other critical Gulf exports. Trump is impulsive, cognitively impaired, and badly advised. To the last, we find it agonizing to watch him careen from threats and bluster to incoherence and fantasies of a dramatic deal, all without any discernible strategic coherence.
We also discussed China’s role, which is key. Fatima thinks Beijing is playing a disciplined long game, keeping Iran in the fight to frustrate Washington, while avoiding any overt actions that might trigger a direct confrontation with the United States. China would prefer de-escalation and restored oil flows, she thought, but also stands to benefit if it can later broker a settlement and present itself as the responsible peacemaker while the United States cements its reputation for unreliability and destructiveness.
Our discussion ended in deep pessimism. None of us could imagine a military solution. Effective diplomacy is unimaginable with this administration in power. A ceasefire now will leave the region in a far worse position than before. Our strategic incoherence is now the most dangerous actor on the stage.
We’re all left, again, hoping for a miracle.
